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INTRODUCTION 
 
In the past decades consumers have attached more importance to food related issues such as 
health, quality, safety, pleasure and ethical issues. The agri-food system in Italy, according to 
the latest statistics, accounts for 13,5% of the GDP; firms population in 2015 registered a 
growth of 0,75% with respect to the previous year (ISTAT, 2016). Yet the economic downturn 
and the international challenges that global market is experiencing have had implications at a 
micro level: firms are facing difficulties in maintaining their competitive advantage and 
positioning. There is no empirical evidence between the economic situation and firms’ 
inclination to adopt unfair commercial practices as misleading advertising. However, from our 
analysis it emerges that sanctions in the agri-food sector increase from year to year. Thus, 
since 2007 the Italian Competition Authority (ICA) has strongly intervened in the agri-food 
sector to reduce such inefficiencies. 
EU consumer policy strategy carried out specific actions to regulate the food sector. Food 
origin labeling and misleading claims are the main objects of this research. This research 
focuses on these aspects so as to highlight the importance of EU quality logos and the Italian 
system of consumer protection, with a focus on deceptive advertising and unfair commercial 
practices in the agri-food sector. 
Thus, the identified research question are: 
 which is the value associated by Swedish and Italian consumers to a specific GI’s label, 
the PGI Maccheroncini di Campofilone? 
 what are the elements that affect the efficiency of fines, penalties and restricting 
intervention tools carried out by ICA and IAP to reduce deceptive and misleading 
advertising practices? 
Concerning methodology, an exploratory research was carried out to investigate the research 
questions related to GIs value and consumers’ food choices. Consumer Ethnocentrism, 
Country of Origin effect, Food Choice Questionnaire and Willingness-to-pay for GIs were the 
dimensions examined through our survey.  
In order to answer the research question related to the efficiency of fines, information and 
data have been collected through several sources following Grounded Theory approach. In 
particular: interviews were organized with key components of ICA, a survey was run among 
companies in the agrifood sector that received a penalty from ICA or IAP, information was 
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collected from Consumer Association’s websites, Corporates’ websites, national print and web 
media titles, while secondary data were collected from ICA and IAP databases. 
This research is divided into three parts. First chapter introduces two important aspects of EU 
consumer policy, namely EU food quality labels and consumer protection in the European 
union, with a focus on the Italian system of consumer protection. Chapter two is focused on 
the exploratory study, carried out in Sweden and in Italy, on the PGI Italian egg pasta. Chapter 
three highlights the Italian system of consumer protection, analyzing the cases of deceptive 
advertising and unfair commercial practices that took place in the Italian agri-food sector. 
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Chapter 1 - Consumer protection and EU quality labels: two 
aspects of consumer policy in the EU 
 
1.1 Consumer policy strategies in the EU 
If consumers are to play a role as fully equal stakeholders in society, they need to understand 
the interlinkages between their interests and those of others. An awareness of their rights as 
stakeholders also demands a greater recognition of their responsibilities to the environment 
and to society at large. 
The political currents driving the growth of consumer policy are part of a wider political trend 
for policies that deliver effective solutions to the problems faced by the general public. 
Economic developments are also behind the rise of consumer policy. The twin forces of the 
globalisation of markets and the wide dissemination of new communication and information 
processing technologies have set in motion significant economic and social changes. They 
have revolutionised the way markets serve consumers. At the same time, these changes have 
also transformed consumer expectations. Consumer policy has to adapt to these new 
developments. 
Changes in markets and expectations can be seen in products, services and in marketing. 
Many of the developments have been beneficial, and have expanded choice to an 
unprecedented degree. The EU’s policies on competition, the internal market and the 
economic and monetary union have played their part in bringing these benefits to consumers. 
This has contributed to the steady rise in consumer expectations, but has also brought about 
new challenges. For these reasons, since 1999, the EU has implemented consumer policy 
strategies. 
The development of consumer policy at the EU level has stemmed from the progressive 
establishment of the single market, supporting the aims laid out in Articles 169 and 12 of the 
Treaty, which promote the interests, health, and safety of European consumers. Its overall aim 
is to equip consumers with the skills and tools to fulfil their role in the modern economy in 
making markets deliver for them and in ensuring effective protection from the risks and 
threats which they cannot tackle as individuals. Consumer policy of the European Union aims 
to maximise consumer participation and trust in the market. 
Steps in the implementation of consumer policy strategies are as follows: 
• Consumer Policy Action Plan 1999–2001;  
• Consumer Policy Strategy 2002–2006; 
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• Consumer Policy Strategy 2007–2013; 
• Consumer Policy Strategy 2014–2020. 
The first Consumer Policy Action Plan of 1999 brought out more effective consumer 
associations and efficient communication between consumers and business. It also provided 
consumers with better information and education, and a high level of health and safety. 
Moreover, it paid a lot of attention to the economic interests of EU consumers. 
The Consumer Policy Strategy 2002–2006 was focused on three main objectives: a high 
common level of consumer protection, an effective enforcement of consumer protection rules, 
and the proper involvement of consumer organisations in EU policies. 
In the period 2007–2013, consumer policy was uniquely well placed to help the EU rise to 
meet the twin challenges of growth and jobs and reconnecting with its citizens. The 
Commission had three main objectives: to empower EU consumers; to enhance EU 
consumers’ welfare in terms of price, choice, quality, diversity, affordability and safety; and to 
protect consumers effectively from the serious risks and threats that they cannot tackle as 
individuals. 
The new consumer programme 2014–2020 will continue to build on the 2007–2013 
successes. Below is a list a concrete steps that will be carried out over the next few years: 
• improving the regulatory framework for product and service safety and enhancing the 
market surveillance framework; 
• reinforcing safety in the food chain; 
• improving information and raising awareness of consumer rights and interests among both 
consumers and traders; 
• building knowledge and the capacity for more effective consumer participation in the 
market; 
• effectively enforcing consumer law, focusing on key sectors;   
• giving consumers efficient ways to solve disputes; 
• adapting consumer law to the digital age; 
• promoting sustainable growth and supporting consumer interests in key sectors. 
In the current consumer policy strategy there will be also some specific actions regarding the 
food sector. Following the adoption of the Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 on the provision of 
food information to consumers, the Commission will promote the application of the new rules 
and explore the need for new initiatives. This is particularly relevant to the labelling of food 
origin and the labelling of alcoholic beverages. Furthermore, the ongoing implementation of 
Regulation (EC) No 1924/2006 on nutrition and health claims will ensure that all claims 
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relating to a beneficial nutritional or health effect of foods are based on science and are not 
misleading for consumers. It will also guarantee the free movement of foodstuffs with 
nutritional and health claims that comply with this Regulation. 
Food origin labeling and misleading claims are the main objects of this research. In the next 
paragraphs we will focus on these aspects so as to highlight the importance of EU quality 
logos and the Italian system of consumer protection, with a focus on deceptive advertising 
and unfair commercial practices in the agri-food sector. 
 
1.2 Food origin labeling: the path towards improving quality in the agri-food 
sector 
A label is intended to help consumers differentiate the labeled product from otherwise similar 
products. A label calls to consumers’ attention the desirable attributes of the product. When a 
firm labels its product, it assumes that the information it provides is important to consumers 
and that they will respond by changing their purchase decisions (Golan et al., 2001). But 
labels are not always truthful. Nowadays, unfortunately, there has been an increasing number 
of cases of misleading labels and food fraud. According to Shears (2010), food fraud is a new 
phenomenon and the authenticity of foods and food labels is currently a major concern for 
many, including scholars, consumers, regulators, and the food industry at all levels of the food 
spectrum. Understandable concerns about deception, fraud, and confusion have led to 
increased mistrust and greater government regulation on traceability (Gutman, 1999). 
According to Charlebois, consumers are particularly concerned about the safety of food and 
the accuracy of labels and they need reassurance that the information on food labels truly 
identifies the products they wish to buy in grocery stores. There is a broad consensus on the 
interrelation between food purchasing and consumer trust. Consumer trust is necessary for 
the implementation of a differentiation strategy to be successful and this is usually based on 
quality attributes. Quality attributes in the food market that consumers are interested in (e.g. 
country of origin, organic, kosher) are usually credence attributes and cannot be evaluated by 
a consumer even after consumption. This phenomenon of information asymmetry between 
consumers and producers could be reduced with the use of food labelling (Jahn et al., 2005).  
Food quality logos in European Union legislation were introduced by the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) in the mid-1990s. The Common Agricultural Policy was born in 
1957 with the Treaty of Rome and became effective in 1962. The objectives of the CAP were 
to: (i) increase agricultural productivity; (ii) ensure a fair standard of living for the 
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agricultural community; (iii) stabilise markets; (iv) provide certainty of food supplies; and (v) 
ensure that those supplies reached consumers at reasonable prices. 
The Common Agricultural Policy, being one of the oldest policies of the European Union, is 
strongly rooted in the European integration project. Due to the CAP's long history, it is also a 
policy that has been reformed on many occasions, and in particular during the past decade 
and a half. 
Nowadays the CAP is aimed at helping European farmers meet the need to feed more than 
500 million Europeans. Its main objectives are to provide a stable, sustainably produced 
supply of safe food at affordable prices for consumers, while also ensuring a decent standard 
of living for 22 million farmers and agricultural workers. 
 
 
This Figure summarises the history of the CAP: the early years, the reflection documents and 
measures taken during the crisis years (the 1970s and the 1980s), the 1992 reform, the 
Agenda 2000, the 2003 reform, the simplification of the CAP, the 2008 Health Check and the 
CAP post 2013. 
For the aim of this research, it is important to focus on the changes that took place in the mid-
1990s, when the CAP focused more on food quality. The policy introduced new measures to 
support farm investment, training, improved processing and marketing. The first European 
legislation on organic farming was implemented and many steps were taken to protect 
traditional and regional foods.  
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1.2.1 Geographical indications and designations of origin: the development of 
the legislation 
With the term regional foods we refer to specialty goods able to attain the European 
designation of geographic origin and specificity (origin labeled products). In 1992 two 
European laws were introduced, Regulation (EEC) No 2081/92 and Regulation (EEC) No 2082 
/92, which allow for three kind of labels: PDO (Protected Designation of Origin); PGI 
(Protected Geographical Indication); DOC and DOCG (controlled origin denomination and 
guaranteed controlled origin denomination). For the purpose of this research we will focus on 
the first two labels that are used for a broad range of food products, while the third type is 
specific to the wine sector.  
The definition of regional products is based upon three elements: geographic specificity, 
historical tradition, cultural and social specificity. The first two are mandatory requirements 
to attain the label. The first element means the product should have intrinsic features that 
differentiate it from similar products. These features must depend on a specificity in the 
production process and/or in the raw agricultural input that can be found only in a well-
defined geographic area. Historical tradition refers to the proof of the existence of the product 
in the past. The last element, cultural and social specificity, means that in the region of origin 
there is a consensus on the identification and evaluation of specific attributes that 
differentiate the product. 
The two regulations mentioned above concerning respectively the protection of geographical 
indications and designations of origin and the issuing of certificates of specific character are 
part of the quality approach of the EU. Regulation (EEC) No 2081/92 introduced two separate 
classes for protected geographical name: designations of origin, and geographical indications. 
The protected designation of origin (PDO) is the name of a region, a specific place, or in 
exceptional cases a country, used to describe an agricultural product or a foodstuff originating 
in that region, specific place or country, and its quality or characteristics which are essentially 
or exclusively due to a particular geographical environment with its inherent natural and 
human factors, and the production, processing and preparation of which take place in the 
defined geographical area. This regulation makes sure that there is a strict link with the area 
of origin, through the use of words like "essentially” or “exclusively" as they relate to the 
product name and its geographical area. 
The protected geographical indication (PGI) instead, is the name of a region or a specific place 
used to describe an agricultural product or foodstuff originating in a given region, specific 
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place or country, and which possesses a specific quality, reputation or other characteristics 
inferable in that geographical origin and the production and/or processing and/or 
preparation of which take place in the defined geographical area. 
So, as pointed out by Berizzi (1997), there is a main difference between the PDO and the PGI; 
that is, for the PGI, it is sufficient that one stage of the manufacture of the product should be 
closely linked to the geographical environment, although it must still be a product originating 
in the region whose name it bears, and it must have a reputation that can be attributed to its 
geographical origin. 
Analysing the effect of Regulation (EEC) No 2081/92, Pacciani et al. (2001) stated that the 
recognition path of a PDO/PGI for a typical product often represents the final or intermediate 
result of the process of valorisation of the product itself. The system designed by this 
regulation implies the codification of the product through the elaboration of product 
specifications (code of practice) containing: area of production, characteristics of the 
production process and of the product itself. 
Regarding Regulation (EEC) No 2082/92, Berizzi (1997) highlighted that unlike Regulation 
(EEC) No 2081/92, it does not confer an exclusive right to use the name of the product, but it 
reserves the use of the name, with the words "guaranteed traditional speciality" (GTS) and the 
appropriate community symbol or logo, for products meeting the specifications. 
Both of the above were replaced as of 20 March 2006 by Regulation (EEC) No 510/2006 on 
the protection of geographical indications and designations of origin for agricultural products 
and foodstuffs, and by Regulation (EEC) No 509/2006 on agricultural products and foodstuffs 
as traditional specialities guaranteed. The main aim of the two new regulations is to simplify 
and make more efficient the registration process. Moreover, these two regulations tend to 
guarantee major consumer protection through wider visibility of the label and the spread of 
EU symbols. 
A further innovation consists of the introduction of a “single document” for the application 
containing information necessary for registration, information and controls.1 For the aim of 
this research it is important to mention Article 13 of Regulation 510/2006 where the Council 
regulates the protection of PDO and PGI. 
A registered PDO or PGI enjoys the broad description of exclusive rights that are provided in 
Article 13.1. It provides that registered names shall be protected against: 
                                                          
1
 http://www.ismea.it/flex/cm/pages/ServeBLOB.php/L/IT/IDPagina/1116 
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(a) any direct or indirect commercial use of a name registered in respect to products not 
covered by the registration, in so far as those products are comparable to the products 
registered under that name, or insofar as using the name exploits the reputation of the 
protected name; 
(b) any misuse, imitation, or evocation, even if the true origin of the product is indicated or if 
the protected name is translated or accompanied by an expression such as style, type, method, 
as produced in imitation, or similar; 
(c) any other false or misleading indication as to the provenance, origin, nature or essential 
qualities of the product, on the inner or outer packaging, advertising material or documents 
relating to the product concerned, and the packing of the product in a container liable to 
convey a false impression as to its origin; 
(d) any other practice liable to mislead the public as to the true origin of the product. 
The intention of the legislator with Article 13 is to prevent fraud by increasing protection for 
PDO and PGI products. According to Evans & Blakeney (2006), this not only prohibits food 
products from outside the region from using the geographical name but also denies the use of 
the name for products within the region that do not meet the standards set forth in the 
application. 
The EU Regulation 1151/2012, or Quality Scheme Regulation, replaced both the 2006 GI 
Regulation and the 2006 Traditional Specialities Regulation, concerning the relevant 
regulatory schemes (PDO, PGI, TSG). It also added the “Optional Quality Terms”. OQTs are a 
new quality scheme introduced by the Regulation. Their declared purpose is to “facilitate the 
communication within the internal market of the value-adding characteristics or attributes of 
agricultural products”. To be eligible as an OQT a locution must: a) relate to a characteristic of 
one or more categories of products, or to a farming or processing attribute which applies in 
specific areas; b) add value to the product as compared to products of a similar type; and c) 
have a European dimension. The Regulation establishes “Mountain Product” and “Product of 
Island Farming” as the first OQTs.  
Use of the “Mountain Product” and “Product of Island Farming” nomenclature is very 
important because it allows for the development of quality differentiation strategies within 
non-homogeneous GIs, where high production costs and low productivity penalise the most 
disadvantaged areas. 
The aim is clear: to provide better opportunities to disadvantaged areas (Mountain or Island), 
enabling a virtuous circle that allows proper remuneration to production factors and the 
strengthening of economic, environmental and social sustainability. This last aspect highlights 
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how the Commission combines protection policies with communication and marketing 
policies in favour of companies. 
According to Evans (2012) the aim is the simplification of the legislation under a single legal 
instrument with more efficient application procedures and stricter standards of certification 
and enforcement. Arfini (2013) highlights the major changes produced by the new Regulation. 
Regarding the distinction between PDO and PGI, EU Regulation No 1151/2012 introduces a 
small but significant improvement towards the simplification and “clarification” useful for the 
producers. Regarding the definition of PDO products, in fact the sentence, “the production, 
processing and preparation of which take place in the defined geographical area”, was 
replaced by “the production steps of which all take place in the defined geographical area”. In 
the same way for PGI products, the sentence “the production and/or processing and/or 
preparation of which take place in the defined geographical area” was replaced by “at least 
one of the production steps of which takes place in the defined geographical area”. These new 
definitions do not alter the meaning of how the Commission distinguishes between PDO or 
PGI products, but they facilitate comprehension for the producers, thereby hopefully, avoiding 
future mistakes in the application process. 
Consequently, consumers will also evaluate more correctly the link between the product and 
the source area. A further innovative aspect introduced by Regulation No 1151/2012 
concerns the requirements for the recognition of PDO and PGI, which is linked to the 
possibility of equalising the status of PDO with some geographical names, although the raw 
material for the products comes from a wider zone of the delimited geographical area. The 
equalisation is permitted as long as the production area of the raw materials is defined and 
there are the specific conditions for the production of that raw material. Moreover, there 
should be a specific control system and it must be waiting for the period of recognition of the 
denomination. 
According to Arfini (2013) a further particularly important aspect established by the new 
regulation is the obligation for member states to protect registered geographical indications 
(GIs) not in terms of one’s own initiative, but ex officio, on the basis of specific action plans 
(Article 13). This last aspect is of great importance from a theoretical point of view for those 
countries, such as Italy, which can brag about having the most famous and imitated GIs all 
over the world. In practice, with more than a thousand denominations distributed among 27 
European counties, some doubts are raised by the real possibility to "prevent" and above all 
to "stop" the illegal use of the denomination in the national territory. A serious and effective 
comparative action assumes that "authorities", who must carry out the supervisory action of 
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all denominations and registered GIs, have a wide awareness (knowledge). For the most 
famous denominations, this is certainly possible, but for many niche denominations the 
usurpation risk exposure certainly appears to be high. Lastly, it remains remarkable how the 
expected "procedures" for the prevention and repression actions can be different between 
European member states, with a foregone conclusion of the differing efficacy of national 
"authorities" during the action of control and prevention within Europe. Italy, for example, 
has entrusted the task of monitoring to the Department of Central Inspectorate for fraud 
repression and quality safeguarding of agri-food products (ICQFR) which operates in 
accordance with the disposition of Regulation (EC) No 882/04 and which shows an 
undeniable knowledge and experience. Unfortunately, frauds in the food field are so many and 
the work, carried out in collaboration with the Nucleo Antifrodi Carabienieri (NAC), is really 
impressive. This illustrates the necessary efforts to protect food GIs not only in EU countries 
with low culture food, but also in Italy. 
 
1.2.2 EU quality logos 
The European Union recognises three quality logos attesting to specific traditions and 
qualities of food, agricultural products and wines, aromatised wines and spirit drinks: 
protected designation of origin, protected geographical indication and traditional speciality 
guaranteed. The first two, PDO and PGI, have a specific link to the region where the product 
comes from, while the TSG logo highlights a traditional production process. Food products are 
eligible for all three logos: PDO, PGI and TSG. Wine is eligible for PDO and PGI, while spirit 
drinks and aromatised wines qualify for PGI recognition. “Through the logos, consumers can 
easily recognise these traditional quality products and can rely on their authenticity in terms of 
regional origin or traditional production. Indeed, as well as providing a useful marketing tool in 
the European Union and on other markets, registration under these schemes provides producers 
with legal protection against imitation or misuse of the product name”2. 
PDO, PGI and TSG foodstuff logos and definitions are as follows: 
 
                                                          
2
 http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/quality/schemes_en 
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The protected designation of origin (PDO) logo underlines the strongest link to the territory, 
requiring that all aspects of production, processing and preparation originate from that 
region. 
 
The protected geographical indication (PGI) logo underlines the local know-how and the close 
link between a product and the place or region. For registered products, at least one of the 
stages of production, processing or preparation takes place in the region, but, for example, the 
ingredients need not necessarily come from that geographical area. 
 
The traditional speciality guaranteed (TSG) logo highlights the traditional production method 
or composition of a product, handed down from generation to generation, without necessarily 
being linked to a specific geographical area. 
 
At the end of 2015, 2,890 quality products were registered in the Database Of Origin and 
Registration (DOOR), 2.,871 coming from EU and 19 extra-EU products. The number of food 
products amounts to 1,311, while 1,579 quality labeled products were related to the wine 
sector. 
 
1.2.3 Effects of EU quality logos: implications for companies 
The aim of this paragraph is to highlight the expected positive and negative effects for the 
companies regarding the use of PDO, PGI and TSG products. According to the external study 
"Study on assessing the added value of PDO/PGI products" commissioned by the EU in 
December 2013, “in most cases GI products achieve a price premium over the corresponding 
standard products even if extreme variability in the extent of the price premium for GI 
products was observed”. But there is an added value beyond higher gross margins for 
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producers of GI products. This added value consists of many different aspects. Below we 
report some of these important aspects that producers must take into account: 
 The protection of intellectual property rights. The function of GI protection in this 
respect is twofold: a) providing the legal framework for reacting effectively against 
attempts of imitation, misuse, use of “GI-sounding” terms; b) acting as a tool to prevent 
the aforementioned issues. 
 Improved visibility, often deriving from better access from participation in fairs, and 
consequently, there will be an increase in sales. 
 Access to new markets. The GI status was found to have promoted access to new 
domestic and/or export markets in most cases. 
 Better access to promotion funds and investment aid. It means better access to support 
from co-financed EU programmes and better access to support for promotion and/or 
investments funded by national or regional governments. Also Becker and Benner 
(2000) stated that products protected by these EU quality schemes have a privileged 
position, not only with respect to legal protection, but also with respect to EU financial 
aid and the eligibility of member state financial aid for the promotion of these 
products. 
 The GI status is able to grant better support to rural development. 
 GI could also have a positive impact on the concerned area as a whole, improving the 
socio-economic environment. 
 GIs play an important role in strengthening the organisation and resiliency of the 
supply chain. 
 GI production guarantees a closer focus on product quality. It is a stimulus to adopt the 
logic of quality assurance and certification procedures. 
 GIs act as a promotional effect for tourism activities. 
 
Regarding negative effects, Belletti et al. (2007) found that, besides direct certification costs, 
there are also all the costs firms need to face in order to adapt the whole firm structure, 
organisation and production process to the contents of the code of rule, but more generally to 
adapt to a “modern” and codified organisational logic, given that often firms involved in 
typical products are artisanal and small. The size of these costs depends both on how “strictly” 
a code has been written when the application for PDO/PGI was presented to the European 
Commission, and on the structural and organisational characteristics of the firms potentially 
involved in the production of the PDO/PGI product.  
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Moreover, it will happen that firms use the PDO/PGI only for part of the whole production and 
there will be some organisation costs due to the need to keep the production lines separate. 
This may cause some inefficiencies in managing processes and require dedicated assets 
(storage structures, plants, transport vehicles, etc.), thus increasing the overall costs. 
According to Belletti \. (2007) there are also always administrative and bureaucratic costs 
connected to filling and keeping registers in order to fit the needs of the inspection body—
other costs that can be considered “psychological costs”. Other costs can derive from the use 
of more expensive raw materials. 
Lastly, the negative effects beyond the use of PDO, PGI and TSG labels regarding food piracy 
and fraud that cause economic damage to the whole chain of production are very hard to 
quantify. The inappropriate use of these logos also has negative consequences on consumers; 
in fact, from that type of use, fraudulent and deceptive practices arise. 
 
1.3 Unfair commercial practices in the EU 
Another important aspect concerning consumer policy is consumer protection. As already 
mentioned above, agri-food piracy and misleading claims regarding food products have not 
only damaged producers but also consumers who ignore the counterfeit origin of the 
products which will not meet consumer expectations. These practices have been critically 
discussed in the last years since they strengthen mistrust in the food processing industry and 
consequently lead to a lack of trust in food (Spiller,  u hlsdorf,  Nitzko, 2014).  
The survey “Consumer attitudes towards cross-border trade and consumer protection”, 
coordinated in 2013 by the European Commission, shows that unfair commercial practices 
are still a significant problem for consumers3. In fact, 44% of consumers said that they came 
across misleading or deceptive advertisements, statements or offers at least once in the past 
twelve months. Of those who have encountered misleading or deceptive advertising, nearly a 
quarter (23%) said that they bought something based on the claims made in the 
advertisement. 
Unfair practices are consistently among the top five sources of complaint received by the 
European Consumer Centres (ECCs). In the following paragraphs we are going to see how 
these deceptive practices are treated in the Italian system of consumer protection. 
 
                                                          
3
 Flash Eurobarometer 358(2013)—Consumer attitudes towards cross-border trade and consumer protection: 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/ flash/fl_358_en.pdf 
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1.3.1 Commercial practices regulation in Italy 
 "The subject damaged by antitrust practice is not only the entrepreneur who has been 
excluded from the market or constrained in his actions by the abuse of dominant position, 
restrictive agreements and agreed practices, but also the consumers, who are the last link in 
the distribution chain and that feel affected by the price increase or the quality decrease of 
goods. The consumer is a market subject on the same level as the commercial entrepreneur 
and both have an interest in preserving its competitive structure against unfair commercial 
practices and anti-competitive behaviour” (Scuffi, 2009, p.341). 
This is the reason why consumer protection has gradually become a priority target for the 
European Competition Authorities, because it is consistent with the current European 
community approach that sees in the legislation not only an instrument of discipline for 
relations among traders, but also a basic rule for economic relations. According to this view, 
the consumer must occupy a central position, or at least a role comparable to the business 
activity. The kind of economy that community treaties have tried to affirm was distant from 
the commercial conception and was characterised by its intention to realise opposing 
interests belonging to those who produce and those who buy. In Italy this concept has 
received influential validation from the work of the united sections of the Supreme Court of 
Cassation, which have stated that antitrust rules are intended to protect not only companies, 
but also consumers, who can assert their rights in all sites where legislation is applied4. 
This legal protection was recently acquired in Italy and derives from a dual intervention plan. 
On one hand, public enforcement is the public plan for safeguarding the true interest in free 
competition, which is reserved for the European Commission and National Authorities, and in 
Italy for the Italian Competition Authority (AGCM), whose penalty-inhibitory activity is under 
the legal supervision of the Court of Justice and by the administrative court (TAR and the State 
Council). On the other hand, the plan for private enforcement is entrusted to the ordinary 
courts which make decisions about negotiations and conduct that could violate national and 
EU competition rules. 
Regarding the specific context of unfair commercial practices, the application has so far been 
entrusted particularly to the Italian Competition Authority (AGCM) and to the Institute of Self-
                                                          
4
 Sentenza del 4 Febbraio 2005, n.2207 che afferma: “La diversità di ambito e di funzione tra la tutela codicistica della 
concorrenza sleale e quella innanzi detta della legge antitrust esclude si possa negare la legittimazione all’azione 
davanti al G.O. ai sensi dell’art. 33, n.  2 della legge n. 287/90, al consumatore, terzo estraneo all’intesa … la legge 
antitrust non è la legge degli imprenditori soltanto, ma è la legge dei soggetti del mercato, ovvero di chiunque abbia 
interesse processualmente rilevante, alla conservazione del suo carattere competitivo al punto da poter allargare uno 
specifico pregiudizio conseguente alla rottura o alla diminuzione di tale carattere”. 
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regulation in Advertising (IAP), although it could also be applied by the ordinary courts, the 
AGCOM and other private subjects that express different codes of practice from the Institute 
of Self-regulation in Advertising. Now we will show in detail the roles of the AGCM and of IAP. 
 
1.3.1.1 The role of the Italian Competition Authority 
Independent administrative authorities, including the Italian Competition Authority (ICA), 
arise for very different needs, depending on the circumstances. There is not a model that 
presides over the establishment of independent authorities, but they are established where 
needed (D’Alberti, 2010, p. 11). 
Independent authorities are administrative organisation models which are characterised by a 
high level of technical competence and by their independence from political orientation, the 
market and regulated companies. Specific rules and procedures require a particularly high 
level of expertise, which should concern not only offices, but also top management. 
Independence is imposed or facilitated, depending upon the case, by the European Union in 
order to obstruct the resistance of governments and of national policies towards the 
realisation of a common European scheme. This independence must be safeguarded firstly by 
the political power of the government through the provision of a guarantee system regarding 
designations, incompatibilities, powers and organisational autonomy. Simultaneously it must 
be guaranteed against pressure groups and regulated companies by maintaining the public 
interest as a reference parameter for the institutional mission. A critical variable that could 
strongly influence the work of an independent authority is represented by funding or rather 
by the necessary resources to effectively carry out its mandate. To this day there are three 
modalities of financing: transfers from the government budget, obligatory contributions 
collected by regulated market participants, and revenues from financial penalties paid by 
regulated companies. A balanced system that ensures the independence of the authorities 
should be based on a mixed formula of state funding and self-financing, which is a 
combination of safeguards against the government policy orientation and regulated market 
participants as well. Authorities may also count on the autonomous management of 
expenditures, over which there is the control of Corte dei Conti. 
"The administrative fines must always be justified on the basis of technical evaluations, 
generally impartial, predictable and non-discretionary political, proportionate, transparent in 
the procedural modalities and always preceded by the opposition with stakeholders. These 
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are the institutional and functional features that characterise independent authorities" 
(Catricalà, 2010, p. 21). 
The Italian independent administrative authorities involved in safeguarding the consumer 
against misleading advertising and unfair commercial practices are the Italian 
communications authority (AGCOM) and the Italian Competition Authority (AGCM). In this 
research we will analyse the work of the Italian Competition Authority, making their role in 
consumer protection understandable. 
The Italian Competition Authority is an independent administrative authority established by 
Law no. 287 on 10 October 1990 ("The Competition and Fair Trading Act", hereinafter “the 
Act”), which introduced antitrust rules in Italy. 
Subsequent laws endowed it with additional powers, the most important of which concern 
the repression of unfair commercial practices, misleading and unlawful comparative 
advertising and the application of conflict of interest laws to government office holders. At the 
top of the Authority's organisational structure we can find the board, composed of the 
president and four members. The rest of the operational structure is divided into directorates, 
offices, and services and is coordinated by the general secretary. Among the board’s 
responsibilities are political leadership functions, while those related to executive 
management are the responsibility of the general secretary. Inside the actual organisational 
structure we can find two main levels which correspond to the diversification between staff 
and line roles. 
In the top position of the staff level, we find the Authority cabinet which represents the 
president either internally or externally, is headed by the cabinet chief and consists of some 
offices, including the central directorate for external affairs and institutional relationships. 
The latter is divided into the press office and the office for relations with public institutions, 
which helps to improve the Authority's image with respect to public opinion. 
Always at the staff level are the secretariats of the president, the cabinet members and of the 
office of the general secretary, the central directorate for legal affairs which provides advice 
and takes care of controversy, the office of international affairs which maintains relations 
with international bodies and, lastly, the research office which conducts research activities 
and carries out the annual report.  
The line level offices are coordinated by the general secretary and are divided into the three 
areas of human and material resources, competition protection and consumer protection. 
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General directorates present at this level are structured into five sectorial directions 5. Within 
the direction for consumer protection, the Authority has established the contact centre 
directorate, to which consumers can report by phone, using a toll-free number, cases of unfair 
commercial practices and misleading or comparative advertising (Catricalà, 2010, p.18–19). 
The Authority has an administrative nature, so its acts are entrusted to the administrative 
court review and, in particular, to the review of the Regional Administrative Court (Tribunale 
Amministrativo Regionale, T.A.R.) of Lazio, whose decisions, in turn, according to the usual 
rules, can be appealed in front of the Council of State. 
According to the Council of State’s words, the examination of the administrative courts under 
supervisor authority's provisions is not a full examination; control performed by T.A.R. has 
the sole aim of verifying the truthfulness of the facts on the basis of the contested measure, 
the cogency of the contextualisation of indeterminate legal concepts required by the rules, the 
logical correctness of the comparison among the verified facts, and the rules as contextualised 
by the Authority.  
The work of the T.A.R., however, cannot lead to a replacement of the assessments made by the 
Authority in respect to the restoration of undefined legal concepts. On the other hand, the 
choice made by the Italian legislator is attributable to the high technical expertise required in 
order to properly assess claims related to unfair commercial practices, and misleading and 
comparative advertising. 
Also with regard to the provision of financial penalties, the court has conferred full 
jurisdiction (powers) to the Authority. The antitrust authority is considered a guarantee 
institution that expresses the impartiality of the administrative function at a maximum level 
and is placed in its own institutional framework, which, at the same time, is different from the 
jurisdiction or classic administration. 
 
1.3.1.2 The role of the Institute of Self-regulation in Advertising 
Self-regulation is an expression of the private autonomy with which a class of individuals, or 
more categories driven by common interests, voluntarily submit themselves to respect the 
rules of a more or less complex body established on the basis of specific purposes. 
The decision of the Italian advertising categories to create a self-regulatory code occurred in 
1963 on the occasion of the Seventh National Congress of Advertising. Three years later, in 
                                                          
5
 Per la tutela del consumatore ci sono le direzioni Energia e Industria, Comunicazioni, Credito, Agroalimentare e 
Trasporti, Servizi 
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1966, the Institute of Self-regulation in Advertising (in Italian IAP, Istituto dell’Autodisciplina 
Pubblicitaqria) was born and was composed of the main organisations representing the 
interests of all subjects involved for various purposes in the advertising sector, with the aim 
described in Article 1 of the code: "Marketing communication must be honest, truthful and 
correct. It must avoid anything likely to discredit it". 
Important dealership companies immediately joined the Institute of Self-regulation in 
Advertising, like SIPRA and OPUS-Proclama, major media, such as RAI-TV and the 
Federazione Italiana Editori Giornali, and many user organisations, such as the Utenti 
Pubblicità Associati and the Federazione professionale della Pubblicità. Over the years there 
were further subscriptions and currently the Institute of Self-regulation in Advertising can 
count on the presence of all major organisations, associations and federations of companies, 
agencies, newspapers, public and private TVs, the Web Operators Federation and also the 
Advertising- Progress Foundation. 
The bodies that have comprised the institute since its inception are the review board and the 
jury; their members are independent from the world of commercial communications and 
perform their duties according to their convictions and without representing the interests of 
any category. 
The review board has the following functions: to autonomously submit to the jury any 
marketing communications that have been reported to it or that it believes to be non-
compliant with the provisions of the code safeguarding consumer interests or marketing 
communication in general; to provide non-binding opinions at the request of the president of 
the jury; to request amendments to any planned marketing communication that appears to 
breach the provisions of the code; to issue desist orders, pursuant to Article 39. 
The roles of the jury are to examine the commercial communications which are sent by the 
review board or by companies and to make pronouncements about them in accordance with 
the code; these are final decisions. The decision consists of an order to cease advertising and if 
traders do not follow the desist order, it may be accompanied by an order to publish the 
decision. 
The jury and review board can, at any time, ask the marketer to supply documentation in 
support of the truthfulness of the data, descriptions, statements, illustrations or testimonials 
used. The jury and review board may avail themselves of experts to evaluate the 
documentation thus produced. Except for the provisions set out in this code, the jury and 
review board perform their duties without formality. 
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Both consumers and consumer associations may resort to the work of the Institute of Self-
regulation in Advertising by submitting a report to the review board for those commercial 
communications considered non-compliant with the self-regulation code; the review board 
may also act on its own thanks to its direct work in monitoring the advertising system. 
Companies, instead, may directly appeal to the jury in order to protect their interests.  
Review board activities start after the signaling of citizens, associations, one of its members or 
the IAP Secretariat. Once the case has been examined, it can be archived whether there is an 
absence of conflicting elements with the code; otherwise the investigation phase is opened. 
The review board asks the trader to prove the truthfulness of the message and can ask for a 
modification if deemed necessary. If the advertiser follows the review board's requests then 
the procedure is archived, otherwise the procedure goes ahead with the resolution, which 
may be abbreviated in the case of a clear conflict with the code, or ordinary conflict. In that 
case, the request is forwarded to the jury. If the examined commercial communications are 
manifestly in opposition with the self-regulation code, the review board president, using his 
own provisions, can release an injunction by immediately suspending the advertising 
campaign. 
The review board can also offer prior opinions on communications that are not distributed 
yet. The verdict can be favourable, favourable with reserve or unfavourable. 
The jury decision process can start after a competitor’s complaint with ordinary conduct from 
the review board, or after a trader’s opposition towards an injunction issued by the review 
board. The jury, which is composed of a minimum of three members, nominates a reporting 
judge and communicates to the interested parties a deadline for the registration of further 
documents. Moreover, the jury summons the parties within the shortest possible period of 
time for a closing argument. After the consultation, the jury retires to the council chambers, 
and promulgates its decision by immediately communicating the ruling to the parties, which 
may be in line or in conflict with the code. In the latter case, the advertisement is stopped and 
a synthesis of the decision can be published. The last step consists of the registration of the 
motivated verdict. 
The Institute of Self-Regulation in Advertising is not able to issue pecuniary penalties like the 
Italian Competition Authority does, although the impact of the cessation of the commercial 
communication against traders who don’t respect the self-regulation code should not be 
underestimated. Damages resulting from resources spent on the implementation of the 
campaign, the subsequent damage to the commercial activity and to the brand image are 
deterrents that should be taken into account by the trader. 
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The European Union looks favourably on self-regulatory bodies in advertising. 
Directive 84/450/EEC on misleading advertising states that “voluntary monitoring carried out 
by autonomous organisations to eliminate misleading advertising can eliminate judicial actions 
or administrative appeals, and therefore must be encouraged”. 
Subsequently, Directive 2005/29/EC on unfair commercial practices states that “it is 
opportune to create codes of conduct so that professionals can apply the principles of this 
directive efficiently in specific economic sectors. The monitoring carried out by those behind 
these codes on a national or at a European level to eliminate practices of unfair competition can 
avoid having to take judicial or administrative steps, and thus should be encouraged”. 
 
1.3.2 The development of commercial practices legislation  
The first consumer protection law was introduced with the Treaty of Rome of 1957, which 
established the European Economic Community. Article 153 of Treaty Establishing the 
European Community (TEC) says: "In order to promote the interests of consumers and to 
ensure a high level of consumer protection, the Union shall contribute to protecting the health, 
safety and economic interests of consumers, as well as to promoting their right to information, 
education and to organise themselves in order to safeguard their interests". 
The European regulatory framework concerning the specific area of misleading advertising, 
comparative advertising and unfair commercial practices is composed of a series of directives 
and regulations issued by the mid-eighties: 
- Directive 84/450/EEC concerning misleading advertising; 
- Directive 97/55/EC amending Directive 84/450/EEC concerning misleading advertising 
so as to include comparative advertising; 
- Green Paper on consumer protection in the European Union, 2 October 2001; 
- Directive 2005/29/EC concerning unfair commercial practices; 
- Directive 2006/114/EC concerning misleading and comparative advertising; 
- Regulation 2006/04/EC on consumer protection cooperation; 
-  The communication "Protecting businesses against misleading marketing practices and 
ensuring effective enforcement", which reviewed Directive 2006/114/EC. 
- updated version of Directive 2005/29/EC, “Guidance on the application of the Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive”. 
These rules introduced by the European Commission and their implementation by member 
states, have played a decisive role in the evolution process of the discipline regarding 
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commercial advertising. Directive 2005/29/EC on unfair commercial practices in particular 
was the one that most influenced changes in consumer protection laws. From this directive 
and its transposition to Italian legislation derive the cases related to the agri-food sector 
analysed in chapter 3 of this research. 
 
1.3.3 The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive and its transposition to the 
Italian system 
Directive 2005/29/EC defines what constitutes an unfair, misleading or aggressive marketing 
practice and clarifies that any commercial claim made by traders in the EU has to be clear, 
accurate and substantiated. It is a clear example of full harmonisation across member states, 
with this being regarded as one of the main aspects of the added value of community action 
(as this was unlikely to be achieved by member states’ actions alone). 
Moreover, the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (UCPD) sets out a ‘black list’ of practices 
which are to be regarded as unfair and are thus banned. 
The 21 September 2007 Legislative Decrees (d. lgs.) No 145/2007 and 146/2007 entered into 
force, transposing directives 2006/114/EC and 2005/29/EC. The first d. lgs. 6 were regarding 
misleading and comparative advertising, more specifically the regulations transposed from 
Directive 84/450/EC, as amended by 97/55/EC and Article 14 of Directive 2005/29/EC. The 
d. lgs. No 146/20077 contains instead the implementation provisions of articles 1–13 and 15–
17 of Directive 2005/29/EC; it replaces articles 18–27 of d. lgs. No 206/2005, named the 
“Code of Consumption”. 
The application of these two d. lgs depends on who the individual is to be protected: if the 
practice is in regard to business to consumer relations, the regulations on unfair commercial 
practices must be applied; if it is a matter of business to business relations related to goods or 
services used in the field of a professional activity, the regulations on misleading advertising 
must be applied. 
This dual track of protection under the new regime of unfair commercial practices and the 
legislation of unfair competition is not clearly distinct but reciprocally integrated, thereby 
creating a new regime of unfair competition which is aimed at ensuring that competition 
                                                          
6
 D.lgs. n.145 del 2 agosto 2007, recante “Attuazione dell’articolo 14 della direttiva 2005/29/Ce che 
modifica la direttiva 84/450/Cee sulla pubblicità ingannevole”. 
7
 D.lgs. n.146 del 2 agosto 2007, recante “Attuazione della direttiva 2005/29/Ce relativa alla pratiche 
commerciali sleali tra imprese e consumatori nel mercato interno e che modifica le direttive 84/450/Cee, 
97/7/Ce, 98/27/Ce, 2002/65/Ce, e il Regolamento (Ce) n. 2006/2004”. 
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takes place in accordance with rules of fairness in the interests of competitors, consumers and 
the community, using instruments of repression coming from both private law and 
administrative law (Genovese, 2008, p.23). 
According to the Legislative Decree No 146/2007 a commercial practice is unfair if it is 
contrary to professional diligence and if it is likely to materially distort the economic behavior 
of the “average consumer” whom it reaches. 
The definition of “professional diligence” adopted by the Italian legislator—“the standard of 
special skill and care which a trader may reasonably be expected to exercise towards consumers, 
commensurate with honest market practice and/or the general principle of good faith in the 
trader’s field of activity”—doesn’t match with the definition of the European legislator—“the 
standard of special skill and care which a trader may reasonably be expected to exercise towards 
consumers, commensurate with honest market practice and/or the general principle of good 
faith in the trader’s field of activity”. 
Interpreting the Italian law in comparison to the community law, it can be said that the unfair 
practice is excluded only when it is proved that the trader has complied with the general 
observation of the principles of fairness and good faith, or with "honest practices" in force in 
his business sector. It requires, essentially, a qualified professional diligence according to the 
specific business practice (Leone, 2008, p.258). 
Another important element of Legislative Decree No 146/2007 concerns the suitability of the 
practice to materially distort the economic behaviour of consumers, with whom it put into 
effect the illicit dangers of unfair practices; moreover, an important evaluation parameter, 
that is the “average consumer”8, has been assigned to the person in charge of the evaluation.  
Regarding a "transactional decision" which is distorted by the trader, this is defined as "any 
decision taken by a consumer concerning whether, how and on what terms to purchase, make 
payment in whole or in part for, retain or dispose of a product or to exercise a contractual right 
in relation to the product, whether the consumer decides to act or to refrain from acting". From 
this definition we get the concept of economic bias to which the consumer can be subjected, 
even as a mere danger caused by an unfair practice (Leone, 2009, p.259). 
Legislative Decree No 146/2007 divides unfair commercial practices into misleading 
practices and aggressive commercial practices. Misleading practices are defined by the new 
Article 21 of the "Consumers' Code", while aggressive practices are defined by the new Article 
                                                          
8
 Secondo il T.A.R. Lazio (Sez.I, 8 Novembre 2006, n. 12120) «il consumatore medio è quel soggetto che, secondo l’ud 
quod plermuque accidit, è dotato della capacità cognitive e che si identifica nel destinatario mediamente intelligente 
accorto e informato sui prodotti del settore merceologico di appartenenza, nonché è in grado di orientare il proprio 
comportamento economico». 
  24 
24 of the "Consumers' Code". Misleading commercial practices are divided into misleading 
actions and misleading omissions. 
Opposite to Directive 2005/29/EC, the Italian legislator has divided the black list into two 
sections, including commercial practices which are in all circumstances considered 
misleading inside Article 23 of the "Consumers' Code", and the commercial practices which 
are in all circumstances considered aggressive inside Article 26. These two categories of 
unfair commercial practices are, in any case, able to materially distort the economic behaviour 
of consumers or their aversion to the professional diligence. 
Another new scenario of Legislative Decree No 146/2007 concerns the introduction of 
protection against trader conduct which occurs after the completion of the contractual 
relationship. Among these commercial practices that cause the consumer to take a 
transactional decision that he would not have taken otherwise, we find: “the need for a service, 
part, replacement or repair”, section 21 letter e) "Consumers' Code"; “the consumer's rights, 
including the right to replacement or reimbursement”, section 21 letter g) "Consumers' Code"; 
“for products and transactions involving a right of withdrawal or cancellation, the existence of 
such a right”, section 22 letter e) "Consumers' Code". 
An important section available in both Legislative Decrees is “Administrative and judicial 
protection”. The provisions contained therein are aimed at strengthening the Italian 
Competition Authority’s power. According to the Legislative Decrees, the Authority, acting on 
its own authority, shall prohibit the continuation of any unfair commercial practices and 
eliminate their effects. This provision in particular represents a turning point and is not seen 
favourably by some experts; in fact, no European Community directive gives the States the 
possibility to confer such power on administrative authorities (Vanzetti, 2009, p.141).  
The provisions also provide an increased inspection power due to the ability to consult the 
fiscal police. This unit can assess the value-added tax and the income tax liability (section 27, 
provision 2, "Consumers' Code") 
As always with respect to the Italian Competition Authority, a rise in the maximum extent of 
the sanctions has been provided in relation to the previous legislation; in particular, all 
administrative fines range from €5,000 to €500,0009. A minimum fine of €50,000 euros is 
imposed for those practices that may threaten, directly or indirectly, the safety of children or 
adolescents, and the health and safety of consumers in general. 
                                                          
9
 Maximum raised to €5.000.000 after Legislative Decree No 95/2012. 
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If the trader fails to comply with the emergency measures or injunctions or instructions to 
remove the effects referred to in the commercial practice, a fine ranging from €10,000 to 
€150,00010 is imposed. In the event of repeated non-compliance, the Authority may order the 
trader to suspend trading for a period which shall not be more than thirty days. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
10
 Maximum raised to €5.000.000 after Legislative Decree No 95/2012 
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Chapter 2 – Consumer preferences and Willingness to pay for 
Italian egg pasta: an exploratory study in Sweden and Italy 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In September 2015, Europe had a total of 3,195 products with Geographical Indications, 591 
protected designation of origin (PDO), 636 protected geographical indication (PGI) and 50 
traditional specialties guaranteed (TSG) related to the food sector. These food products are 
generally considered qualitatively superior in terms of ingredients, materials and production 
methods. 
The case of pasta is particularly interesting because, differently from other product categories 
with several PDO and PGI product references, in Europe there are only three dried egg pasta 
to date: Maccheroncini di Campofilone PGI, Schwäbische Spätzle PGI and Pâtes d'Alsace PGI11. 
Campofilone is a small village located in the Marche region where the tradition of manual 
manufacture of egg pasta started in the fifteenth century. Often sold as a premium private 
label production in many big retailer chains, the award of PGI for Campofilone small 
companies gives now some new opportunities to compete in international markets. 
In fact, after the economic downturns of 2007, domestic consumption of food products 
plummeted and Italian companies, in particular SMEs, had to concentrate their efforts on 
exports. 
Pasta is one of the most known foodstuffs all over the world, a traditional food linked with 
Italian culture and lifestyle, and its reputation could be considered as one of the drivers of 
Made in Italy.  
The total value of Italian pasta exported all around the world was €1.776.654.000 in 2014. 
When it comes to dried egg pasta, the total amount exported in 2014 is €155.227.000, thus a 
niche valuing 1/10 of the whole foreign market. 
Dried egg pasta is appreciated in many countries and European Nordic countries, especially 
Sweden is a potential target market. In 2007 the amount of egg pasta exported to Sweden was 
€3.481.000, while in 2014 this amount increased by 150% reaching €8.718.000.12  
                                                          
11
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/quality/door/list.html?recordStart=0&recordPerPage=10&recordEnd=10&sort.milest
one=desc&filter.dossierNumber=&filter.comboName=&filterMin.milestone__mask=&filterMin.milestone=&filterMax.
milestone__mask=&filterMax.milestone=&filter.country=&filter.category=PDOPGI_CLASS_27&filter.type=PGI&filter.st
atus=REGISTERED 
12
 http://www.ice.gov.it 
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According to the 2014 Ernst & Young report on consumer trends in Nordic Countries, food 
quality and ultimately healthier food options, are singled out by consumers as an emerging 
trend for the future. Ecological raw ingredients, locally produced food, no additives and 
minimal impact on the environment are priorities in all Nordic countries, perhaps most 
prominently in Sweden, where consumers have high awareness and demand. 
Furthermore, the results of the 2014 Nordic food survey revealed that both consumer product 
companies and the retailers agree that food quality, in terms of ingredients, materials, 
production methods, as well as convenience, in terms of simplicity and ease of use, will be the 
key trends by 2020. Concerning nutrients, protein has the biggest growth potential in the 
Nordic region. 23% of the consumers predict that they will eat more proteins.13 
The Swedish Food Composition Database provides information on the nutritional 
composition for more than 2000 foods and dishes14. For each food, data on more than 50 
nutrients are presented. It is an initiative by the Swedish National Food Agency. Searching for 
the word “pasta”, the database realizes 19 different products. Among these products, the 
highest score in terms of proteins, based on 100gr of product, is “pasta egg noodles”15, with 
14.00 grams. 
Thus, being the above-mentioned PGI’s pasta very high in proteins, with an average content of 
16gr per 100gr of product, there would be an interesting market potential in Sweden, to be 
explored by Italian SMEs. This potential would be even more important if we consider that 
Maccheroncini di Campofilone PGI is produced using 7-10 eggs per 1 Kg of semolina16, dried 
Schwäbische Spätzle / Schwäbische Knöpfle PGI is produced using 4-6 eggs per 1 Kg of 
semolina17, Pâtes d'Alsace PGI is produced using 7 eggs per 1 Kg of semolina18. 
If proteins can be considered a proxy of healthiness for Swedish consumers, thus 
communicating their content in combination with origin can be a marketing tool to adopt in 
Nordic countries. 
The objective of this work is three-fold: first, to shed some light on the value associated by 
Swedish and Italian consumers to a specific GI’s label, the PGI Maccheroncini di Campofilone. 
Second, to explore whether Consumer Ethnocentrism (CE) as a measure of pro-national 
orientation moderates consumers value perceptions towards GI foods, namely whether 
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 Ernst & young report “Nordic food survey 2015, consumer trends”, 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY_food_Survey_2015/$FILE/EY-food-Survey-2015.pdf 
14
 http://www.livsmedelsverket.se/en/food-and-content/naringsamnen/livsmedelsdatabasen/ 
15
 http://www7.slv.se/SokNaringsinnehall/Home/MyList# 
16
 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:302:0016:0017:IT:PDF 
17
 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:069:0003:0004:IT:PDF 
18
 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2005:047:0006:0010:IT:PDF 
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higher Consumer Ethnocentrism would lead to more positive consumers value perceptions in 
relation to GI foods. Third, to understand which attributes consumers consider more 
important when buying foodstuff. 
For this reason, in the next paragraph a literature review on Ethnocentrism, Country of Origin 
effect and EU Quality Labels is outlined. Section 3 discusses material and methods. The results 
are presented in section 4 and then are discussed in section 5. In section 6 conclusions are 
drawn. 
 
2.2 Literature review and hypotheses 
During the last years, Country Of Origin effect, Ethnocentrism in the field of food consumption 
and Geographical Indications role to influence consumer behavior, have been investigated by 
many scholars. 
 
2.2.1 Country Of Origin 
The Country of Origin (COO) effect on buyer perceptions and evaluations has been a widely 
studied phenomenon in the international business, marketing, and consumer behavior 
literature. Systematic research on the COO effect began with the publication of Schooler's 
(1965) seminal article in the Journal of Marketing Research "Product Bias in the Central 
American Common Market" (Peterson & Jolibert, 1995), underlining that significant 
differences were found in the evaluation of products, that were identical in all attributes 
except in country name shown on the label. 
Subsequently Obermiller and Spangenberg (1989) developed a framework that distinguishes 
between cognitive, affective and normative processing of the country-of-origin cue. These 
three processes are not separate and independent determinants of preferences and 
behaviors. They are constantly interacting. 
Country-of-origin research has mainly studied the use of country of origin as a cognitive cue, 
an informational stimulus about or relating to a product that is used by consumers to infer 
beliefs regarding product attributes such as quality (Bilkey & Nes, 1982; Steenkamp, 1990). 
On the other hand, Fournier (1998) found that country of origin relates a product to national 
identities, which can result in a strong emotional attachment to certain brands and products. 
She describes the case of a second-generation Italian-American woman who is strongly 
attached to Italian products, especially considering food-related items. For this lady, “Italy” 
has very strong emotional and symbolic connotations. Thus, Botschen and Hemettsberger 
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(1998) reported that consumers link country of origin not only to product quality, but also to 
feelings of national pride and memories of past vacations. 
Because purchasing a country’s product is a way of supporting its economy, the purchase of 
products from countries that engage in objectionable activities can be regarded as an a-moral 
action. A salient norm that relates to country of origin is the norm to buy domestic. Shimp & 
Sharma (1987) theorized that many consumers consider morally appropriate to buy products 
that are manufactured or grown in their own country (Verlegh & Steenkamp, 1999). 
As pointed out by Lewis & Grebitus (2016), regarding the specific context of food products, 
research has shown that COO can have a variable impact on consumers’ purchasing behavior. 
Moreover, some researchers found that COO is not among the primary cues used by 
consumers when making purchasing decisions. For example, Insch and Jackson (2013) asked 
individuals in New Zealand what they considered when selecting a food item from a trolley. 
While about 40% considered price and taste and about 18% mentioned health and quality, 
only 3.5% said COO. Meanwhile, other studies have found that COO labels on foods such as 
meat and olive oil can increase consumers’ willingness to pay for the foods. 
Many studies investigated the impact of geographical indications on consumers' perception 
and behavior. For the purpose of this research we have collected information that is 
connected with consumers’ buying behavior and willingness to pay. 
Dransfield et al. (2005) has demonstrated in a variety of contexts that consumers are willing 
to pay more for domestic than imported food. For example, consumers from France, Denmark, 
Sweden, and the UK offered about 5% more for pork with domestic labels. Other international 
studies have demonstrated that consumers are usually willing to pay a premium price for 
domestic and local food (Cicia & Colantuoni, 2010; Ehmke, 2006; Lusk et al., 2006; Roosen, 
Lusk, & Fox, 2003; Verlegh & Steenkamp, 1999). 
An argument for choosing national products is the fact that consumers perceive these as 
fresher, tastier and with a general higher quality (Chambers et al., 2007). 
Drawing on this literature on Country Of Origin we formulate the first hypothesis: 
H1A  Swedish consumers are disposed to spend more for domestic pasta than Italian pasta. 
H1B Swedish consumers are disposed to spend more for domestic pasta than for pasta without 
Country Of Origin.  
H1C Italian consumers are disposed to spend more for domestic pasta than for pasta without 
Country Of Origin. 
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2.2.2 Consumer Ethnocentrism 
Previous studies has linked the country of origin effect to levels of consumer ethnocentrism. 
Consumer ethnocentrism focuses on the responsibility and morality of purchasing foreign-
made products and the loyalty of consumers to products manufactured in their home country 
(Shimp and Sharma, 1987). Consumer ethnocentrism, according to Lusk et al. (2006), “relates 
to how individual’s buying habits are influenced by loyalties toward their own countries 
and/or antipathy toward other countries” (Lewis  Grebitus, 2016). 
COO has been investigated in its strict connection with the use of GI labelling, such as the 
European Designation of Origin Labels (i.e. PDO/PGI/TSG), which ensures that the customers 
are aware of the product’s origin. These labels can useful tools for decision-making during the 
purchasing process (Chrysochou et al., 2012; Fotopoulos and Krystallis, 2003; Krystallis et al., 
2009). 
One of our aims is to focus on the normative side and use the consumer ethnocentrism (CE) as 
a way to explain the COO effect. The Consumer Ethnocentrism Tendencies Scale (CETSCALE) 
developed by Shimp and Sharma (1987) is one of the most widely used scale to measure the 
consumer ethnocentrism. 
In their article, Shimp and Sharma (1987) established that consumer ethnocentrism is the 
application of the ethnocentric construct in the economic environment and has inherited the 
main premises and properties of ethnocentrism. It is defined as a “trait-like property of an 
individual’s personality” and encompasses “the beliefs held by the consumers about 
appropriateness, indeed morality, of purchasing foreign-made products”. 
The first work introducing the ethnocentrism concept was that of Sumner (1906), where it 
was considered as a general construct reflecting the view of things in which one’s own group 
is the center of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it.  
Sharma et al. (1995) and Rawwas and Rajendran (1996) demonstrated that Consumer 
ethnocentrism may lead to overestimation of specific attributes and overall quality of 
domestic products and to an underestimation of that of foreign products. However, according 
to Watson and Wright (2000), these attitudes may connote consumer behaviors but they are 
not equivalent to them, since the latter are product-specific. Shimp and Sharma (1987) 
postulated that CE can provide an explanation as to why consumers prefer domestic over 
foreign products even when there is no obvious reason for such a preference. It has been 
found that the level of CE varies among product categories. Sharma et al. (1995, in Piron, 
2000), indicated that the less important a product category the greater the ethnocentric 
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tendencies and behavior exhibited by consumers. Also, Javalgi et al. (2005) found that the 
impact of CE in purchasing intention of a particular product is moderate when this product is 
perceived as absolutely necessary. Moreover, the impact of CE depends on the level of 
development of consumers’ home country. According to Wang and Chen (2004), consumers 
from a developed country tend to appreciate more favorably domestic products over 
imported ones, hence resulting to an increase of the impact of Consumer ethnocentrism on 
buying the former and rejecting the latter. The reverse has been observed in developing 
countries, where consumers perceive foreign products (especially those originating in 
prestigious countries) as superior compared to their domestic counterparts (Chryssochoidis 
et al. 2007). 
Concerning socio-demographic variables, background literature does not always agree. 
Schooler (1971) and Tongberg (1972) found that older people tended to evaluate foreign 
products higher than younger people did, whilst Wang (1978) and Chryssochoidis et al. 
(2006) found no such effect. Schooler (1971), Anderson and Cunningham (1972), Dornoff et 
al. (1974), Wang (1978) and Chryssochoidis et al. (2006) found that people with more 
education tended to rate foreign products more highly than people with limited education did, 
even if Tongberg (1972) found no such relationship. Wang (1978) found that higher income 
people tended to have a more favorable acceptance of foreign products in general than lower 
income people did. In general, older individuals tend to be more ethnocentric and opposed to 
foreign imports (McLain & Sternquist, 1992; Vida & Fairhurst, 1999). Females tend to be more 
ethnocentric than males (Vida & Fairhurst, 1999; Sharma et al.1995). As individuals have 
more education and higher incomes, they are less ethnocentric (Sharma et al. 1995). 
Perrea et al. (2015) explored whether Consumer Ethnocentrism (CE) as a measure of pro 
national orientation moderates Customer Value perceptions towards GI foods, namely 
whether higher CE would lead to more positive CV perceptions in relation to GI foods. 
Customer Value towards GI foods is the trade-off between perceived gains and losses from the 
consumer point of view. Results indicate that ethnocentric attitude as an expression of 
consumers’ pro-national orientation seems able to impact (i.e. moderate). On the other hand, 
consumers with moderate ethnocentric attitudes hold in association with own-country GI 
food products stronger perceptions about their (higher) price, and the (higher) risks of 
disconfirmed taste and consumption. 
Van Ittersum et al. (2007) found that, if consumers are convinced that through a certification 
scheme (the PGI) the local economy and the local culture can be supported, the protection can 
result in a higher willingness to pay. 
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As pointed out by Lewis & Grebitus (2016), several previous studies have examined the 
relationship between COO and consumer ethnocentrism (Balabanis & Diamantopoulos, 2004; 
Cilingir & Basfirinci, 2014; Schnettler, Miranda, Lobos, Sepulveda, & Denegri, 2011). 
Umberger, Feuz, Calkins, and Stiz (2003) discovered that consumers’ strong desire to support 
U.S. producers was a reason consumers preferred products labeled with COO information. 
Hustvedt, Carroll, and Bernard (2013) used consumer ethnocentrism to explain U.S. 
consumers’ willingness to pay for wool from Australia, the United States, and specific U.S. 
states. Orth and Firbasova (2003) discovered that consumer ethnocentrism was a strong and 
significant predictor of Czech consumers’ preference for Czech-made yogurt. Qing, Lobo, and 
Chongguang (2012) found that consumer ethnocentrism impacted Chinese consumers’ 
purchase attitudes toward fresh domestic fruit. Juric and Worsley (1998) found that 
ethnocentrism, income, education, age, sex, and consumers’ interest in foreign cultures were 
the main factors that influenced New  ealand consumers’ perception of food product 
attributes. 
Analogously, we can hypothesize that: 
H1A Older consumers are expected to show high ethnocentric attitude in their evaluations of 
food products. 
H1B People with low educational level are expected to show high ethnocentric attitude in their 
evaluations food products.  
H1C People with higher incomes are expected to be less ethnocentric. 
H1D High ethnocentric consumers are more willing to pay for Geographical Indication foods  
H1E High ethnocentric Swedish consumers will prefer domestic pasta 
 
2.2.3 Food Choice factors 
Grunert (2005) gave a definition of food quality, saying that from a consumer perspective, it is 
mostly composed of experience qualities like taste and convenience supplemented by 
credence qualities like origin, production method, and healthfulness. Since these qualities are 
unknown before purchase, the consumers need some quality cues as guidance to form 
expectations about the quality of a product (Steenkamp, 1990). The way in which quality 
labels affect consumers’ perceptions will depend on both consumer and product 
characteristics. Consumers may differ in terms of motivation and previous knowledge, and 
they may also differ in other attitudinal and demographics characteristics that affect the 
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process. The effect of quality labels may also differ depending on the type of product (Grunert 
& Aachmann, 2015). 
In their article Grunert & Aachmann (2015) analyzed the results of sixteen studies dealing 
with awareness of the quality labels. The degree of awareness found, differs widely between 
different studies. The study in which it was found a deep awareness of PGI quality label was 
Verbeke et al. (2012), where it reaches the 36%. This study was conducted in six countries: 
Belgium, France, Italy, Norway, Poland, Spain. In one pan-European study carried out in all 27 
EU countries (London Economics, 2008), the awareness was generally low (4% for PGI), with 
an exception among Greek consumers (54% awareness for PGI). Moreover, the authors 
analyzed research investigating the relation between quality labels and willingness to pay. 
They observed that several studies employing conjoint analysis or direct questioning methods 
generally find that consumers are willing to pay a premium price for quality labeled products.  
Two important inferential beliefs, generally considered to be the core evaluative dimensions, 
used by the consumer to infer quality in food purchasing are ‘pleasure in consuming’ 
(Thomson et al., 1994) and ‘good for health’ (Fischler, 2001). 
Regarding the typical food products, taste is usually claimed as a crucial explanatory factor of 
consumers’ preferences and behavior (Vanhonacker et al., 2010; Platania and Privitera, 
2006). 
Van Ittersum et al. (2007) affirmed the regional certification label guaranteeing authenticity 
of a product and not an imitation, is supposed to influence consumers in their purchasing 
behavior through two different dimensions. The first one is the quality warranty dimension, 
which represents consumers’ belief about the ability of the label to guarantee a higher quality 
level. The second is an economic support dimension, which positively relate to consumers’ 
willingness to buy and pay for the protected regional product. Moreover he stated protecting 
regional products and marketing them with regional certification labels may be beneficial for 
SMEs producing and marketing regional products. 
Teuber (2011) affirms that the most important factor determining the success of a PDO/PGI 
product is the perceived higher quality compared with non-protected products. Furthermore, 
that quality in relation to regionally denominated foods is closely related to other socially 
constructed concepts such as “authenticity”, “healthy” and “tradition”. 
Almli et al. (2011) studied the image of traditional food at pan-European and national levels in 
six countries: Belgium, France, Italy, Norway, Poland and Spain. They have conducted a 
consumer survey about traditional food products (TFP). The respondents indicated their 
personal general opinion and feelings about TFP and characterized TFP according to 15 
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intrinsic and extrinsic product attributes. Attributes contribute significantly to a positive 
general image of TFP when the pan-European sample is studied as a whole: special taste, good 
appearance, consistent quality, healthy, safe, high nutritional value, difficult to prepare and 
low availability. 
Bryła examined consumer attitudes, preferences and behaviours regarding origin food in 
Poland carrying out a survey in a representative sample of 1000 Polish consumers. According 
to the respondents, the characteristics differentiating origin food from conventional food 
include links with tradition as well as sensory and health properties. 
The perceived authenticity of origin products depends to the largest extent on such factors as: 
natural taste, product quality, sale in the region of origin and labelling. The most important 
determinants of origin food selection include: traditional recipe, taste, and product 
uniqueness. 
Tsakiridou et al. (2009) have investigated consumer preferences for organic and Traditional 
Specialty Guaranteed (TSG) food products, examining potential factors that affect the 
willingness to pay a premium to purchase these specific quality food products. Majority of the 
respondents were buyers of organic and TSG products and appear to be willing to pay a 
premium up to two euros per kilo to buy either organic or TSG food products. Factors that 
most influence consumers’ WTP a price premium to buy these specific products are personal 
beliefs about production techniques, health, environmental, and quality attributes. 
Pieniak et al. (2009) explored the association between traditional food consumption and 
motives for food choice in six European countries (Belgium, France, Italy, Norway, Poland and 
Spain). Price is generally recognised as an important factor influencing food choice in general 
(Furst, Connors, Bisogni, Sobal, & Falk, 1996; Jomori, Proenca, & Calvo, 2008; Steptoe et al., 
1995), but in this study the importance of price when buying daily meals wasn’t significantly 
associated with both general attitude toward traditional food and traditional food 
consumption. The most important factor related to traditional food consumption behavior 
was familiarity. It means that people who attached more importance to familiar products are 
more likely to choose a traditional food product. This result validates one of the important 
elements of the definition of traditional foods, specifically the fact that it concerns products 
that are frequently consumed and whose consumption habit is transferred from one 
generation to the other (Guerrero et al., 2009). 
Hersleth et al. (2012) explored consumers' motives for food choice using the Food Choice 
Questionnaire. The most important factor for consumers' food choice revealed in this survey 
was Sensory appeal (pleasant texture, smell nice, looks nice, tastes well). This supports the 
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results from earlier focus groups, specifically that the sensory characteristics are important 
for lamb meat consumers and makes this to a conscious choice. Moreover, the following 
factors were highly important for both Norwegian consumers and Italian consumers: Health, 
Convenience and Natural content. Focusing on the Italian consumers, they scored significantly 
higher than the Norwegian consumers for all factors except Sensory appeal. Authors’ 
explanation is that the following factors are more important for Italian consumers than 
Norwegian consumers; Health, Convenience, Natural content, Price, Familiarity, Ethical 
concern and Ethnocentrism (means 3,95 vs 5,24).  
Markovina et al. (2015) explored the validity and reliability of the Food Choice Questionnaire 
(FCQ) across 9 European countries (Germany, Greece, Ireland, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the 
Netherlands, the UK and Norway). There was highly significant agreement in the relative 
importance of food choice factors between countries. Price was ranked as most important 
food choice factor in five countries (Spain, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and the Netherlands), 
sensory appeal was ranked first for three countries (Norway, Germany and the UK) while 
natural content was ranked as the most important factor in Poland. Familiarity and ethical 
concern were consistently ranked as least important in all countries.  
Perrea et al. (2015) found the main GI relevant purchasing reasons stated are ‘healthy diet’ 
(70.9  of the sample) and ‘tasting new flavours’ (57.3  of the sample), indicating GI 
consumers’ beliefs of healthiness and tastiness vis-a -vis GI foods.  
Consequently, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
H3A In accordance with Hersleth et al. (2012) and Markovina et al. (2015), the most important 
factor for consumers' food choice revealed in this survey is Sensory appeal. 
H3B In accordance with Hersleth et al. (2012), factors like Health, Convenience, Price, 
Familiarity, Ethical concern and Ethnocentrism are significant for Italian consumers. 
 
2.2.4 Awareness of and willingness-to-pay for GIs 
In her study Carpenter (Carpenter et al. 2008) tested the impact of PGI label on French 
consumers, controlling their reaction to four different presentations of two products: without 
a specific label, with a simple regional label, with both a regional label and the PGI label, and 
finally, with the previous two labels along with an explanation of the nature of the PGI label. It 
was found that the impact on overall quality and purchase intention emerged only when the 
relatively unrecognized PGI label was explained to consumers. 
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Fotopoulos & Krystallis (2001) investigated the WTP for the PDO Peza olive oil and found that 
consumers are willing to pay a premium price for a PDO olive oil. Premium price that is much 
more higher if they provide an explanation of the PDO label. 
Fotopoulos & Krystallis (2003) also studied the case of the PDO Zagora apples in the Greek 
market and stated when consumers are provided with information regarding the PDO 
scheme, they seem to adopt a positive point of view vis-a-vis the label, in fact, on average, 87.8 
per cent of the sample agree with a series of positive effects of the PDO label. 
For these reasons we hypothesize: 
H4A PGI label, when is understood by the consumer, enhances the willingness to pay a premium 
price. 
 
Cernea (2011) analysed Danish consumers’ willingness to pay for domestic PGI labeled 
cheese products. She found out the most important variables that enhance the WTP of Danish 
consumers are age, education and income. She also pointed out that WTP for traditional PGI 
cheese depends on the quality perceptions they have about the PGI cheese. 
Several studies have shown a positive relationship between age and the likelihood of 
purchasing national brands (versus generic brands) and high quality products (e.g., Granzin 
and Schjelderup 1980, McEnally and Hawes 1984, Quagrainie et al. 1998). 
Vlontzos & Duquenne, (2014) found the most influential factors purchasing olive oil, amongst 
others being examined, are the age, the educational level, and the placement of residents in 
olive oil producing zones. 
Many studies examining the relationship between the size of household and the purchase of 
brands or high quality products find a negative relationship (e.g., McEnally and Hawes’ 1984, 
Kinnucan and Clary 1995, Quagrainie et al. 1998). 
Consumers tend to have a higher preference for products from their own region (Van 
Ittersum 1999). According to Dekhili   d’Hauteville (2009) and to Van Ittersum et al. (2013) 
the concept of region of origin acts as a quality cue on certain food markets. Lorenz et al. 
(2015) found that the preference and the purchase of regional pork in the German Federal 
State North-Rhine Westphalia is to a great extent determined by the construct Personal 
Norms/Affective Attitudes which has the largest direct impact on consumers’ purchase 
intention. 
Van Ittersum et al. (2000) suggested that gender may well relate to differences in the 
likelihood of purchasing high quality regional products. In fact Sheth et al. (1999) report that 
for food, differences between males and females are present in health-oriented perceptions of 
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foods and beverages. Females, for instance, tend to purchase fresh vegetables more because 
they perceive it to be healthier than canned vegetables. Bellizzi et al. (1981) refer to a study 
showing that males tend to perceive generic products more favourable than females. 
Kinnucan and Clary (1995) show that females tend to purchase high quality cheeses more 
often than males do.  
Thus, we hypothesize: 
H4B willingness to pay has a positive relationship with the age of the consumer.  
H4C Consumers living in Marche region are more willing to pay a premium price for PGI pasta 
from Campofilone than consumers living outside the region of origin of the product.  
 
Several studies investigated the consumers’ willingness to pay a premium price for a 
Geographical Indication’s Product.  
Sanjuán et al. (2012) investigated the Willingness to pay for direct market of beef in two 
Spanish and two French regions located on both sides of the Pyrenees. The estimation of WTP 
reveals that the largest price premium is triggered by those consumers mainly motivated by 
the search of private benefits, such as freshness and the guaranty of the production process. 
Urbano et al. (2008) analysed the willingness to pay more for beans from La Bañeza-León. 
The survey was conducted in the cities of Leo n and Ponferrada. They found half of the 
consumers (48.3%) were willing to pay more, 39.3% of consumers up to 10% more, 8.7% of 
consumers up to 20% more, and only 0.3% of consumers up to 30% more. It was also 
detected that consumers willing to pay more for PGI products were 36 to 45 years old. 
Fotopoulos   Krystallis (2003) investigated the case of the “PDO  agora” apples in the Greek 
market and found that consumers view positively PDO labels for which they are willing to pay 
a premium price, higher than that for a commercial indication. 
Van Ittersum et al. (2007) found that consumers have a favourable image of regional 
certification labels, which significantly influences their willingness to buy and pay for 
protected regional products, through consumers’ quality perceptions and relative attitude 
towards the protected regional product. 
Perrea et al. (2015) investigated Consumer Value (CV) perceptions towards certified own-
country GI food products in the form of trade-offs between perceived Values (i.e. gains) and 
perceived Costs (i.e. losses) from the consumption of such products. They found that the vast 
majority of their sample was willing to pay a +10% premium above standard price to 
purchase GI foods. 
In light of the above-mentioned literature we formulate our lasts hypotheses: 
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H4D Italian consumers are willing to pay a premium price for PGI Italian pasta compared to 
pasta coming from Italy without such recognition.  
H4E Swedish consumers are willing to pay a premium price for PGI Swedish pasta compared to 
pasta coming from Sweden without such recognition.  
 
2.3 Materials and Methods 
An exploratory research was carried out in Sweden, in summer 2015, and in Italy in summer 
2016. 
 
2.3.1 Product analysed and background context 
Campofilone is a medieval village located on a hill in the lower Valle dell'Aso valley at an 
altitude of 210 m above sea level. An agricultural centre, it is located amidst very picturesque 
scenery ranging from the white, snow-capped peaks of the Parco dei Monti Sibillini mountain 
park to the green hills to the azure Adriatic Sea. The area has a particularly good climate, as its 
proximity to the sea is such that the breeze makes the climate very pleasant by mitigating the 
coolness caused by altitude. ‘Maccheroncini di Campofilone’ differs decidedly from other 
types of pasta owing to the thinness of the dough sheet and the very finely cut strands of 
pasta. These characteristics give the product a very short cooking time of one minute in 
boiling water or directly in the sauce without the need for pre-boiling. Another fundamental 
characteristic demonstrating the uniqueness of ‘Maccheroncini di Campofilone’ is the 
percentage of egg used in the dough, which is markedly higher than that used in other types of 
pasta. Between 7 and 10 eggs are used per kilogram of durum wheat semolina or common 
wheat flour, or at least 33 % if expressed in percentage terms. This percentage and the slow 
drying process make for a very high-yielding product: while 250 g of generic pasta 
corresponds to two generous helpings, the same quantity of ‘Maccheroncini di Campofilone’ 
gives four helpings. Because it is high yielding, ‘Maccheroncini di Campofilone’ can absorb 
more sauce than other types of pasta (EC No: IT-PGI-0005-0886-27.07.2011). 
 
2.3.2 Data collection 
In Sweden, a questionnaire was developed and completed through personal interviews to 190 
respondents. Data collection lasted one month (from 15th of July to 14th of August 2015) and 
took place in Gothenburg. A convenience sample was created through a random collection on 
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a Ferry Boat. In Italy a survey was implemented through an online panel of 485 consumers 
(183 of them were from Marche Region, the region of origin of Maccheroncini PGI). 
In both countries, in order to target questions to a specific audience, we used a screening 
question, asking the surveyed if they have bought or eaten any Italian food during the 
previous three months. 
Overall, the final number of valid questionnaires was 672. 
 
2.3.3 Questionnaire design 
The questionnaire consisted of 4 parts. In section 1 we used ten items from the originally 17-
item CETSCALE, developed by Shimp and Sharma (1987), to measure the ethnocentrism. 
Respondents were asked to evaluate ten statements using a seven-point Likert scale, where 1 
stands for “strongly disagree” and 7 for “strongly agree”. 
In section 2 we have investigated consumer preferences when buying food. The evaluation 
criteria were derived from the Food Choice Questionnaire (FCQ) (Steptoe et al., 1995), which 
concerned the overall evaluation criteria that consumers bear in mind when purchasing food 
products. To understand which are the most important features we used a simplified version 
of the Food Choice Questionnaire (FCQ). Originally consisting of 36 items divided into 9 
factors we decided to keep 15 items excluding categories like weight control and natural 
content. We decided to keep the more significant items of FCQ because not all questions 
included in the list by Steptoe et al. (1995) were relevant for the purpose of this study. 
Respondents were asked to evaluate these 15 items using a seven-point Likert scale, where 1 
stands for “not at all important” and 7 for “extremely important”. 
Section 3 presented a specific question on the knowledge of the PGI certification and 
investigated the consumer willingness to pay: we illustrated the PGI logo asking them if they 
had seen it before and if they knew its meaning. Thus, we tested their willingness to pay for a 
specific product: dried egg pasta. 
We gave respondents the price of dried egg pasta, made in an unspecified country in EU, sold 
in super and hypermarkets. Afterwards, to understand the importance for them of a specific 
country of origin and a quality label certification like PGI related to dried egg pasta, we asked 
the amount of money they would have been willing to spend for: 1 kg dried egg pasta made in 
Sweden, 1 kg dried egg pasta made in Sweden with PGI, 1 kg dried egg pasta made in Italy, 1 
kg dried egg pasta made in Italy with PGI. 
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In section 4 we collected socio-demographic data as well as specific economic data regarding 
the amount of money they spend on food each week.  
 
2.3.4 Data Analysis 
The data set was analysed using the IBM software SPSS®, version 21. Means of two or more 
groups were compared using ANOVA tables, taking into account only reliable results (p-
value<0.05). Pearson Correlations were also used to properly check the correlation between 
variables. 
 
2.4 Results 
Our sample is composed by 672 total valid interviewees, 320 female, 352 male,. 
We have collected 190 questionnaire in Sweden, 302 in Italy except Marche and 183 in 
Marche region (Italy). 
 
 Age see PGI 
meaning 
PGI 
household 
income 
(€) 
household 
size 
weekly food 
expenditure 
(€) 
Sweden 50,8 15% 0,11 4596,62 2,49 140,98 
Italy 49,5 71% 0,7 2544,79 2,86 98,75 
Marche 44,1 77% 0,7 2643,4 3,14 105,76 
 
 
Table 1 
 
Table 1 shows the means of some important variables we have taken into account. 
The Swedish sample is the older one with an average age of 50 years old, very close to Italian 
one which is 49,5. In Marche region the average age of respondents is 44 years old. 
It should be noted the awareness level of PGI logo. 11% of Swedes know its meaning, while in 
Italy the awareness is higher, with 70%.  
Concerning demographic characteristics of the sample it is worth to underline the differences 
between samples at country level: Swedish sample is richer, families are smaller compared to 
Italy, but tend to spend more for foods on a weekly base. 
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An important outcome for the aim of this research, which is not represented on Table 1, is 
that in all of three samples, interviewees can be considered frequent shopper, in details: that 
is 53,3% Swedes; 63,9% Italians and 67,8% Marche people do more than half of the food 
shopping. 
 
2.4.1 Country Of Origin 
In our questionnaire we assumed that average market price of 1kg dried egg pasta is 30 SEK 
(3€). 
From the table we observe no relevant difference between preference for Italian or Swedish 
egg pasta among the Swedish sample. 
Moreover, Swedish consumers are disposed to spend 1€ more for 1kg of domestic pasta than 
for a pasta without COO.  
 
 
 
  Table 2 
 
H1A  Swedish consumers are disposed to spend more for domestic pasta than Italian pasta. NOT 
SIGNIFICANT, REJECTED. 
H1B Swedish consumers are disposed to spend more for domestic pasta than for pasta without 
Country Of Origin. CONFIRMED. 
 
 
Like for the Swedish sample, we assumed that average market price of 1kg dried egg pasta in 
Italy is 3€. Italian sample is disposed to spend on average 0,46€ more to buy 1kg of domestic 
dried egg pasta than for a pasta without COO. 
 
 
 
1 Kg made 
in Swe 
1 Kg Swe 
PGI 
1 Kg made 
in Ita 
1 Kg Ita 
PGI 
Mean 4 4,27 3,97 4,28 
N 156 150 152 150 
Std 
deviation 
1,102 1,276 1,119 1,257 
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1 Kg made 
in Ita 
1 Kg Ita 
PGI 
1 Kg Ita PGI 
Campofilone 
Mean 3,46 3,85 4,13 
N 481 481 476 
Std 
deviation 
1,48 1,76 2,08 
 
 
    Table 3 
 
H1C Italian consumers are disposed to spend more for domestic pasta than for pasta without 
Country Of Origin. CONFIRMED. 
 
2.4.2 Ethnocentrism 
Results show that Italians are much more ethnocentric than Swedes. 
Ethnocentricity variable is calculated as the mean value among our 10 Item Consumer 
Ethnocentrism Tendencies Scale. 
 
COUNTRY ETHNOCENTRICITY 
Sweden 3,03 
Italy 4,91 
Marche 4,95 
 
Table 4 
 
 
We didn’t find correlation between age of the consumers and the ethnocentricity. We have 
also selected the 25% older consumers in the sample but the result was not sufficient to 
confirm our hypothesis. 
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ANOVA Table df F Sig. 
age * 
ETNOCENTRICITY 
60 1,117 0,262 
 
591 
  
 
651 
  
agegroup * 
ETNOCENTRICITY 
60 1,271 0,089 
 
591 
  
 
651 
  
 
  Table 5 
 
H2A Older consumers are expected to show high ethnocentric attitude in their evaluations of 
food products. REJECTED. 
 
In according line with Sharma et al., we have found that ethnocentrism is lower in consumers 
with high education level of the consumers. People with low educational level tend to be more 
ethnocentric. In detail: 
EDUCATION ETNOCENTRICITY N Std. Deviation 
no formal 
education 
5.3182 11 155.166 
primary school 4.9560 75 152.681 
lower 
secondary 
school 
4.6911 270 137.460 
higher 
secondary 
school 
4.3488 80 150.063 
tertiary 
education 
3.8450 171 155.806 
university 
degree 
4.0250 44 137.539 
Total 4.4229 651 151.447 
 
  Table 6 
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H2B People with low educational level are expected to show high ethnocentric attitude in their 
evaluations food products. CONFIRMED. 
 
Quite significant relation was found analysing consumers’ income and ethnocentricity. 
Even this result is in line with Sharma et al. (1995). 
 
  INCOME ETNOCENTRICITY 
INCOME Pearson correlation 1 -,200** 
 Sig. (2-tailed)  0 
 N 615 602 
ETNOCENTRICITY Pearson correlation -,200** 1 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0  
 N 602 659 
 
Table 7 
 
 
ANOVA Table df F Sig. 
INCOME * 
ETNOCENTRICITY 
60 1,521 0,009 
 
541 
  
 
601 
  
 
       Table 8 
 
H2C People with higher incomes are expected to be less ethnocentric. CONFIRMED. 
 
 
We checked if high ethnocentric people (25% of the sample) would have spent more for PGI 
egg pasta. 
This is true for PGI egg pasta from Campofilone (+0.37€, Table 9) even if we didn’t find a 
strong significance with the ANOVA table  (Table 10). 
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ethnogroup 
 
Swe PGI Ita PGI 
Ita PGI 
Campofilone 
0 Media 4,31 3,92 3,9905 
 
N 138 460 322 
 
Deviazione 
std. 
1,275 1,65 2,0491 
1 Media 4,1 3,97 4,3638 
 
N 5 159 149 
 
Deviazione 
std. 
1,308 1,695 2,11281 
 
 
    Table 9 
 
 
 
 
ANOVA Table df F Sig. 
Swe PGI * ethnogroup 1 0,12 0,73 
 141   
 142   
Ita PGI * ethnogroup 1 0,101 0,75 
 617   
 618   
Ita PGI Campofilone * 
ethnogroup 
1 3,313 0,069 
 469   
 470   
 
 
     Table 10 
 
H2D High ethnocentric consumers are more willing to pay for Geographical Indication foods. 
REJECTED. 
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Our results suggest that low ethnocentric Swedes are willing to pay a price slightly higher for 
pasta made in Italy and high ethnocentric Swedes are disposed to pay an higher amount of 
money for pasta made in Sweden than for pasta come from Italy (Table 11). However, the 
correlation was not significant (Table 12). 
SWE_ethnogroup 
 
made in 
Swe 
made in 
Ita 
0 Mean 3,99 4,09 
low ethnocentric N 109 107 
 
Std deviation 1,188 1,185 
1 Mean 4,1 3,72 
high 
ethnocentric 
N 40 38 
 
Std deviation 0,851 0,922 
Total Mean 4,02 3,99 
 
N 149 145 
 
Std deviation 1,106 1,131 
 
        Table 11 
 
ANOVA Table df F Sig. 
made in Swe * 
SWE_ethnogroup 
1 0,275 0,601 
 
147 
  
 
148 
  
made in Ita * 
SWE_ethnogroup 
1 3,064 0,082 
 
143 
  
 
144 
  
 
     Table 12 
 
 
H2E High ethnocentric Swedish consumers will prefer domestic pasta. REJECTED. 
  47 
2.4.3 Food Choice Factors 
TAB 13. Food Choice Questionnaire and Consumer Ethnocentrism Tendencies scale 
Nr Factor Statement Sweden Italy Marche 
Region 
TOT 
FCQ 1 Health Is nutritious   5,94 5,77 5,81  
FCQ 6 Health Is high in protein 4,32 5,02 5,04  
  MEANS 5,13 5,39 5,42 5,33 
FCQ 2 Sensory 
Appeal 
Smells nice   5,55 5,85 5,44  
FCQ 7 Sensory 
Appeal 
Looks nice   5,24 5,59 5,37  
FCQ 11 Sensory 
Appeal 
Has a pleasant texture 5,19 5,75 5,39  
FCQ 15 Sensory 
Appeal 
Tastes good 6,44 6,28 6,25  
  MEANS 5,60 5,87 5,61 5,72 
FCQ 3 Mood Helps me relax   4,6 5,18 4,98  
FCQ 9 Mood Makes me feel good 5,87 6,04 5,64  
  MEANS 5,22 5,61 5,31 5,42 
FCQ 4 Convenience Is easy to prepare     4,1 5,5 5,08  
FCQ 10 Convenience Is easily available in shops 
and supermarkets 
4,95 5,8 5,32  
FCQ 14 Convenience Takes no time to prepare   3,84 5,01 4,63  
  MEANS 4,30 5,44 5,01 5,01 
FCQ 5 Price Is not expensive 3,86 5,57 5,02  
FCQ 13 Price Is good value for money 5,44 6,1 6,02  
  MEANS 4,64 5,83 5,52 5,42 
FCQ 8 Familiarity Is familiar   4,01 5,52 4,91 4,95 
       
FCQ 12 Ethical 
Concern 
Comes from countries I 
approve of politically  
4,43 5,35 5,25 5,07 
         
CE 1 CETscale Only those products that 
are unavailable in 
3,52 5,11 5,31  
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Sweden/Italy should be 
imported. 
CE 2 CETscale Swedish/Italian products, 
first, last and foremost. 
4,61 5,93 5,88  
CE 3 CETscale Purchasing foreign-made 
products is anti-
Swedish/Italian. 
2,03 3,87 3,78  
CE 4 CETscale It is not right to purchase 
foreign-made products, 
because it puts  
Swedish/Italians out of 
jobs. 
2,6 4,41 4,62  
CE 5 CETscale A real Swedish/Italian 
should always buy 
Swedish/Italian-made 
products. 
2,41 4,88 5,03  
CE 6 CETscale We should purchase 
products manufactured in 
Sweden/Italy instead of 
letting other countries get 
rich out of us. 
2,86 5,27 4,98  
CE 7 CETscale Swedish/Italians should not 
buy foreign products, 
because this hurts  
Swedish/Italian business 
and cause unemployment. 
2,5 4,73 4,76  
CE 8 CETscale It may cost me in the long-
run but I prefer to support 
Swedish/Italian products. 
4,33 5,37 5,54  
CE 9 CETscale We should buy from foreign 
countries only those 
products that we cannot  
obtain within our own 
3,34 5,22 5,26  
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country. 
CE 10 CETscale Swedish/Italian consumers 
who purchase products 
made in other countries are 
responsible for putting their 
fellow Swedish/Italians out 
of work. 
2,2 4,27 4,4  
 
Table 13 
 
Table 13 shows the mean scores for each of the 25 items in the questionnaire, and the mean 
score for each of the factors in Sweden, Italy and Marche region. 
Results from t-tests showed that Italian consumers scored higher than Swedish consumers for 
all factors. The differences were most evident for Convenience (1.14), Price (1.19), Familiarity 
(1.51), Ethical concern (0.92). Lastly, we found the biggest difference for Ethnocentrism 
(1.88). 
According to Hersleth et al. (2012) the most important food choice factor for both Swedes 
(5.60) and Italians (5.87) was Sensory appeal with the following elements: pleasant texture, 
smell nice, looks nice, tastes well. Moreover, another highly important factor for both Swedish 
consumers and Italian consumers was Health (5.13 Swe, 5.39 Ita). This factor confirms our 
premise that Swedish consumers pay lot of attention to elements like proteins and nutrients. 
Other important factors (>5) for Italians are Convenience, Price, Familiarity, Ethical concern 
and Ethnocentrism. 
These findings confirm our hypothesis H3E and H3F. 
H3A In accordance with Hersleth et al. (2012) and Markovina et al. (2015), the most important 
factor for consumers' food choice revealed in this survey is Sensory appeal. CONFIRMED. 
H3B In accordance with Hersleth et al. (2012), factors like Health, Convenience, Price, 
Familiarity, Ethical concern and Ethnocentrism are significant for Italian consumers. 
CONFIRMED. 
 
Our results are in line with many studies on traditional food products where “taste” is 
considered a crucial variable for consumers’ food choices (Vanhonacker et al., 2010; Platania 
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and Privitera, 2006; Almli et al., 2011; Bryła, 2015), and in some cases it will lead consumers 
to pay a premium price (Perrea et al., 2015). 
Another important dimension that came out from our research and which is in line with many 
studies, is “health” (Fischler, 2001; Teuber, 2011; Tsakiridou et al., 2009; Almli et al., 2011; 
Perrea et al., 2015). 
The importance of appearance, in our questionnaire investigated as “looks nice”, was pointed 
out also by Almli et al. (2011) and Hersleth et al. (2012). 
Price, which is generally recognised as an important factor influencing food choice in general 
(Furst, Connors, Bisogni, Sobal, & Falk, 1996; Jomori, Proenca, & Calvo, 2008; Steptoe et al., 
1995) seems to be a very important factor for Italians (5,83) and mildly important for 
Swedish (4,64). 
 
2.4.4 Awareness of and willingness-to-pay for GIs 
Our sample shown high level of awareness of PGI logo. 70% of Italian consumer are aware of 
this logo, while 11% of Swedish consumers know its meaning. According to EU publication 
“Special Eurobarometer 440: Europeans, Agriculture and the CAP”19, in 2015 in Italy only 
29% of the consumers were aware of the PGI logo. The awareness was much lower in Sweden 
where it reached 8%. 
Considering the whole sample, consumers with high awareness of PGI logo are those with 
higher willingness to pay a premium price, only for pasta from Campofilone PGI (+0.46€, 
Table 14). 
 
meaning 
PGI 
 Swe PGI Ita PGI Ita PGI 
Campofilone 
no Mean 4,26 3,96 3,7799 
 N 130 271 137 
 Std deviation 1,335 1,69 1,80627 
yes Mean 4,28 3,94 4,2737 
 N 19 359 339 
 Std deviation 0,806 1,646 2,17008 
  
   Table 14 
                                                          
19
 https://data.europa.eu/euodp/en/data/dataset/S2087_84_2_440_ENG 
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ANOVA Table df F Sig. 
Swe PGI * meaning PGI 1 0,003 0,955 
 147   
 148   
Ita PGI * meaning PGI 1 0,041 0,839 
 628   
 629   
Ita PGI Campofilone * meaning PGI 1 5,541 0,019 
 474   
 475   
 
              Table 15 
 
In light of the above mentioned, our H4A “PGI label, when is understood by the consumer, 
enhances the willingness to pay a premium price” is PARTIALLY CONFIRMED. 
 
Our findings show a barely significant relation between age and willingness to pay for Ita PGI 
and Ita PGI Campofilone. 
 
ANOVA Table df F Sig. 
 Swe PGI * age 58 1,248 0,171 
 
89 
  
 
147 
  
  Ita PGI * age 64 1,409 0,024 
 
564 
  
 
628 
  
Ita PGI Campofilone * 
age 
59 1,44 0,023 
 
416 
  
 
475 
  
 
 
     Table 16 
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For this reason our hypothesis H4B “willingness to pay has a positive relationship with the age 
of the consumer” is REJECTED. 
 
Our results suggest that consumers from the region of origin (Marche) are willing to pay a 
premium price for PGI pasta from Campofilone. On average they are willing to pay 1.23€ more 
compared with Italian consumers (Table 17). 
 
Country Mean N 
Std 
deviation. 
ITALY 3,66 294 1,88723 
MARCHE 4,89 182 2,16025 
Total 4,13 476 2,08212 
 
 
     Table 17 
 
 
ANOVA Table df F Sig. 
Ita PGI 
Campofilone * 
country 
1 42,926 0 
 
474 
  
 
     Table 18 
H4C Consumers living in Marche region are more willing to pay a premium price for PGI pasta 
from Campofilone than consumers living outside the region of origin of the product. 
CONFIRMED. 
 
Both Italian and Swedish consumers confer value to the PGI label. 
Swedish are willing to pay on average +6,75% more for a Swedish PGI pasta compared to a 
Swedish pasta without such recognition. Italians as well are willing to pay on average 
+11,27% more for an Italian PGI pasta compared to an Italian pasta without such recognition. 
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made in 
Swe 
Swe PGI 
Mean 4 4,27 
N 156 150 
Std deviation 1,102 1,276 
 
 
     Table 19 
 
 
 made in Ita Ita PGI 
Mean 3,46 3,85 
N 481 481 
Std deviation 1,487 1,76 
 
 
     Table 20 
 
For these reasons H4D and H4E are confirmed. 
H4D Italian consumers are willing to pay a premium price for PGI Italian pasta compared to 
pasta coming from Italy without such recognition. CONFIRMED. 
H4E Swedish consumers are willing to pay a premium price for PGI Swedish pasta compared to 
pasta coming from Sweden without such recognition. CONFIRMED. 
 
2.5 Discussion 
Hersleth et al. (2012) explored consumers' motives for food choice, regarding ethnocentrism 
they found that Italian consumers were much more ethnocentric than Norwegian (5.24 vs 
3.95). Even if we check differences within Italian and Swedish our results are very similar 
(4.91 vs 3.03). 
In according with Wang (1978) and Chryssochoidis et al. (2006) we found no relation 
between age and ethnocentricity.  
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Our results are also in line with Schooler (1971), Anderson and Cunningham (1972), Dornoff 
et al. (1974), Wang (1978) and Chryssochoidis et al. (2006), in fact educated people tend to be 
less ethnocentric. 
Not surprisingly, we have found that higher income people tended to have a more favorable 
acceptance of foreign products (Sharma et al., 1995; Wang, 1978). 
We checked if high ethnocentric people (25% of the sample) would have spent more for PGI 
egg pasta. No correlation was found with PGI Swedish pasta nor PGI Italian pasta. But this was 
true for PGI egg pasta from Campofilone (+9.27 , +0.37€), even if we didn’t find a strong 
correlation. This result could be seen in line with Perrea et al. (2015), to whom higher 
Consumer Ethnocentrism would lead to more positive consumer perception in relation to GI 
foods. 
An important outcome of this study is that low ethnocentric Swedish are willing to pay a price 
slightly higher for pasta made in Italy and high ethnocentric Swedish are disposed to pay an 
higher amount of money for pasta made in Sweden than for pasta from Italy. 
Results from our Swedish sample confirm what has been demonstrated by Dransfield et al. 
(2005) Cicia & Colantuoni (2010), Ehmke (2006), Lusk et al. (2006), Roosen, Lusk, & Fox 
(2003), Verlegh & Steenkamp (1999), that Swedish consumers are disposed to spend more 
for domestic pasta than for pasta without Country Of Origin (+1€, +25 ). 
It was surprising that Swedish sample tent to evaluate Swedish pasta the same as the Italian 
pasta (tab 3). An explanation of these two results could be, as pointed out by Chambers et al. 
(2007), that consumers perceive national products as fresher, tastier and with a general 
higher quality. 
Similar result came out from the Italian sample, in fact Italians are willing to spend more for 
domestic pasta than for pasta without Country Of Origin (+0.46€, +15.3 ). 
It should be noted that the value given by the Italian sample to pasta from Campofilone PGI is 
19.36  (+0.67€) higher compared to Italian pasta without PGI and 7,27  (0,28€) higher 
compared to a PGI Italian Pasta. 
In according with Markovina et al. (2015) price (5.42) and sensory appeal (5.72) were the 
most important food choice factors considering the whole sample. At the same time, 
Familiarity and Ethical concern are ranked as least important like in all the other countries. 
We also would like to highlight two factors, one for Sweden and one for Italy. Health 
represents for the Swedish sample an important factor (5.13) and confirms our premise that 
Swedish consumers pay lot of attention to elements like proteins and nutrients. Price, instead, 
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is much more important for Italians than for Swedish (5.83 Vs 4.64), this could reflect the 
economical situation of the Countries. 
Analogously to Hersleth et al. (2012), Vanhonacker et al. (2010), Platania and Privitera 
(2006), Almli et al. (2011), Bryła (2015) we noted that taste has an important role in 
consumers food choices: the mean for Swedish sample was 6.44, for Italians reached 6.28. 
We have found an item of Mood factor, “Make me feel good”, that is considered very important 
for both Swedes and Italians, respectively 5.87 and 6.04. 
Further research should take into account the specific factor of Mood, since it seems to be not 
negligible for consumers. 
We have found an high awareness of PGI logo among our Italian sample, more than double 
compared to the “Special Eurobarometer 440: Europeans, Agriculture and the CAP” of 2015, 
where it reached 29%. The awareness of our Swedish sample instead, was a bit higher (11%) 
but in line with the above mentioned study where it reached the 8%. 
In our study we have used the awareness of PGI logo to see if there is a positive correlation 
with willingness to pay. Web have found that exist a correlation between awareness and WTP 
for pasta from Campofilone PGI. 
Our result partially confirm the findings of Carpenter et al. (2008) and Fotopoulos & Krystallis 
(2001, 2003), according to which when the PGI label is understood by the consumer enhances 
the willingness to pay a premium price. 
Like many other studies Cernea (2011), Vlontzos & Duquenne, (2014), Granzin and 
Schjelderup (1980), McEnally and Hawes (1984), Quagrainie et al. (1998), we have found a 
correlation between age and willingness to pay of the consumers. 
In according with Van Ittersum (1999), it has been found that consumers from the region of 
origin (Marche) are willing to pay a premium price for PGI pasta from Campofilone. On 
average they are willing to pay 1.23€ more (+33.61 ) compared with Italian consumers. 
Regarding GI’s value, our findings are in line with Sanjuán et al. (2012), Urbano et al. (2008), 
Fotopoulos & Krystallis (2003), Van Ittersum et al. (2007), Perrea et al. (2015). Both Swedes 
and Italians would pay a premium price to buy a PGI pasta from their own country compared 
with a local pasta without such recognition. Swedish are willing to pay +6,75% more, while 
Italians would pay +11,27%. 
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2.6 Conclusions and managerial implications 
The objective of this work is three-fold: first, to shed light on the value associated by 
consumers to a specific GI’s label, the PGI Maccheroncini di Campofilone. Second, to explore 
whether Consumer Ethnocentrism (CE) as a measure of pro-national orientation moderates 
consumers value perceptions towards GI foods, namely whether higher Consumer 
Ethnocentrism would lead to more positive consumers value perceptions in relation to GI 
foods, and vice versa. Third, to understand which attributes consumers consider more 
important when buying foodstuff. 
Our study confirm that consumer attribute a considerable value to PGI pasta from 
Campofilone and PGI from their own country. In particular we have shown that consumers 
from Marche region are willing to pay 1.23€ more (+33.61 ) compared to Italian consumers. 
Moreover, Swedish and Italians would pay more for a PGI pasta coming from their Nation 
compared to a local pasta without the Geographical Indication. 
We checked if highly ethnocentric people (25% of the sample) would have spent more for PGI 
egg pasta, finding a correlation only for PGI egg pasta from Campofilone, not for PGI from 
Sweden nor Italy. 
In line with other similar surveys, Italian consumers are highly ethnocentric (see Hersleth et 
al., 2012). 
In agreement with Hooghe et al. (2006, 2007), data analysis indicates that the sample of 
Swedish interviewed is not ethnocentric.  
Lastly, our results show which are the most important attributes for consumers when buying 
foodstuff. Using the Food Choice Questionnaire we have found the most important factor for 
both Swedish and Italian consumers is sensory appeal. 
Swedish consumers are very concerned about healthy foods, while Italians give more 
importance to Price factor. 
Surprisingly Mood was important for the whole sample. Further researches should be 
oriented to investigate relationships between food characteristics and mood. 
In light of the above results there are some implication for SMEs. 
Quality is a wider concept, does not refers only to Country of Origin or Consumer 
Ethnocentricity. In fact the use of Food Choice Questionnaire suggests that sensory appeal has 
an important role in consumers choices. 
However, both the PGI and the Country of Origin effect are key functions in guiding the choice 
of a consumer towards a product. 
According to the literature, protein has the biggest growth potential in the Nordic region. 
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Results suggest that proteins can be considered a proxy of healthiness for Swedish 
consumers, thus SMEs should take this aspect into account for their marketing campaigns; 
protein content in combination with the PGI logo could be a decisive marketing tool to adopt 
in Nordic countries. Moreover, in this specific case of egg made pasta, Swedish consumers do 
not consider Made in Italy an essential feature that guide their purchase intention. The 
assumption that the value of Italian pasta is higher than other countries cannot be given for 
granted. 
This research has certain limitations. First, it is an exploratory research. Second, it has been 
used descriptive statistics. In further researches additional emphasis should be given by 
multivariate analysis. Third, methodological problem in the choice of willingness-to-pay 
question. Exist different methods to elicit the WTP, using one single question could produce a 
bias, because it is not compatible with a real purchase and consumption setting. 
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Chapter 3 - Deceptive advertising and unfair commercial 
practices in the Italian agrifood sector.  
 
Chapter 2 is structured as it follows. Section 2 highlights the methodology used to investigate 
our research topic. Section 3 shows the Italian context of Consumer Protection. Thus, we 
present our data and information analysis and then we provide a discussion in order to 
answer the research question. Conclusion points out further research questions.  
 
3.1 Introduction 
The agrifood system in Italy, according to the latest statistics, accounts for 13,5% of the GDP; 
firms population in 2015 registered a growth of 0,75% with respect to the previous year 
(ISTAT, 2016). Yet the economic downturn and the international challenges that global 
market is experiencing have had implications at a micro level: firms are facing difficulties in 
maintaining their competitive advantage and positioning. According to Nomisma (2014), 
among the critical issues affecting the productive context, the small size of the businesses 
followed by a level of concentration in the distribution phase that is not yet in line with what 
is seen in other European Countries, are main problems reducing the opportunities for 
achieving economies of scale; moreover, contrary to what is perceived within the collective 
imagination, a substantial share of Italian food depends on supplies of important primary 
agricultural products (such as cereals, soybeans, beef and pork, milk) from abroad. 
Infrastructural deficits, the high costs of the “system” and the strategies adopted by firms to 
reduce the costs of productive factors, have reshaped the competitive environment and ask 
firms to employ an adequate set of competences and resources capable to maintain a 
competitive advantage.  
There is no empirical evidence between the economic situation and firms’ inclination to adopt 
unfair commercial practices as misleading advertising. 
From our analysis it emerges that sanctions in the agrifood sector constantly increased in the 
period 2007-2013, except for 2012, growing from €524.000 in 2007 to €1.890.000 in 2013 
(+260%). 
Thus, since 2007 the Italian Competition Authority (ICA) has strongly intervened in the 
agrifood sector to reduce such inefficiencies: according to the data collected on its website, 
sanctions and fines in this sector have represented from 17% to 45% of all the interventions 
on yearly basis. Moreover the Institute of Self-regulation in Advertising or IAP (in Italian 
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“Istituto per l’Autodisciplina Pubblicitaria”) has been called to intervene in the sector several 
times as well. 
Thus this research, by following the principles of grounded theory, wants to promote a 
discussion on the following research question: what are the elements that affect the efficiency 
of fines, penalties and restricting intervention tools carried out by ICA and IAP to reduce 
deceptive and misleading advertising practices? 
The insights emerging from this study regard not only multinational corporations, for whom a 
penalty of thousands euros would compromise the corporate image rather than operational 
activities, but also many Italian SMEs who instead perceive an ICA intervention as a serious 
and concrete threat for the prosecution of the business.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
This case study follows the insights emerging from Charmaz, 2006 with regards to Grounded 
theory. Grounded theory can be successfully employed for formulating new hypothesis from 
emerging data; in research designing the principles proposed by Eisenhardt (2002), Charmaz 
(2006), Dunne (2011) have been followed, performing a literature review with a twofold aim: 
on one side emerging insights were employed for framing the context and on the other they 
have been used for supporting emerging hypothesis.  
According to the literature (Corbin & Strauss; 2008; Charmaz, 2006; Denzin & Lincoln, 1994) 
information and data have been collected through several sources.  
Interviews have been organized with key components of ICA; secondary data have been 
collected in order to outline ICA interventions in the agrifood business. Thus, a survey has 
been run among companies in the agrifood sector that received a penalty from ICA or IAP 
during the period 2007-2012, collecting all relevant information about every single measure 
regarding the food sector, such as company name, product category, media used for the 
campaign, law violated by the campaign, amount of fines.  
Moreover, using LexisNexis Academic archival database (LexisNexis, 2016), an online 
resource allowing the content of local, national and international print and online media titles 
to be searched, a sampling strategy has been developed. The focus is on national Italian print 
and web media titles (Wells and Caraher, 2014) looking for comments and interviews 
released by managers and owners under investigation.  
Finally, corporate websites of the companies involved by IAP and ICA provisions and 
sanctions were investigated to check for official positi  ons and press releases, as well as 
consumers’ associations websites, blogs and social media, in order to understand how these 
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players were affected by these measures in terms of changes in marketing or strategies. The 
steps of this work are shown in figure 1.  
 
 
 
FIGURE  1 
 
 
Primary data have been collected through a survey. Firstly we have asked, by a phone call, for 
the person who faced the ICA or IAP decision, after we have sent an email to the contact 
provided. Aim of the survey was try to understand if the company adopted any changes in 
their communication activities or in other business activities. 
Secondary data have been collected and employed in findings interpretation; thus, literature 
reviews have been carried out in order to explore the following issues: the Italian system 
designed to ensure consumers’ rights preservation; the motivations behind firm’s choice of 
adopting unfair commercial practices; the impact of misleading practices on firm’s strategy; 
and the impact and efficacy of fines.  
 
SURVEY 
LEXIS NEXIS 
ICA AND IAP 
DATABASE 
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AND WEB MEDIA 
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3.3 Background context: the Italian system to preserve and guarantee 
consumers’ rights 
The relevance of the phenomenon has stimulated the interest of Institutions both at national 
and European level. The role of national organizations and Authorities is to provide a support 
and regulate specific aspects of the wider problem of unfair commercial practices whilst 
European Commission’s aim is to harmonize consumer regulations among the European 
countries.  
In Italy a set of laws has been introduced in the food industry in order to preserve and 
guarantee consumers’ safety and choice’ options. As it emerges from Fig1, Institute of Self-
regulation in Advertising or IAP (in Italian “Istituto per l’Autodisciplina Pubblicitaria” ) and 
ICA  (in Italian AGCM – Autorità Garante per la Concorrenza ed il Mercato) are the main actors 
designated to monitoring consumers’ safety and rights.  
Moreover, background research20 highlights the mediation role played by consumers’ 
associations (such as Acu, Codacons, Altroconsumo, Cittadinanza Attiva, Assoutenti, 
Adiconsum, among others) for informing and educating consumers, not only about their 
rights and the risks arising from unfair practices, but also about the system of tools and 
organizations that are made available.  
The system of relations between consumers, firms and institutions in Italy can be represented 
as in FIGURE 2 
 
FIGURE 2 
 
                                                          
20
 Ministry of Economic Development. http://www.sviluppoeconomico.gov.it/index.php/it/cittadino-e-
consumatori/associazioni-dei-consumatori/cncu 
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The Italian Competition Authority (Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato) was 
established in Italy by Law no. 287 of 1990. It is an independent body since decisions are 
based on the competition law without interference by the Government. Having as aim the 
citizens’ welfare, the Authority enforces rules against anticompetitive agreements among 
undertakings, abuses of dominant position as well as concentrations (e.g., mergers and 
acquisitions, joint ventures) which may create or strengthen dominant positions detrimental 
to competition. The Italian Competition Authority is also in charge of several other 
competencies, including protecting consumers from misleading advertising, comparative 
advertising which may bring discredit on competitors’ products or cause confusion, as well as 
unfair commercial practices among undertakings (from AGCM website: 
http://www.agcm.it/en/). 
Therefore,ICA has evolved over the time since its establishment: the boundaries of its activity 
have been reframed in accordance to EC directives and to the changes occurring in the Italian 
Law System.   
Since 1992, the Italian Competition Authority (ICA) has been granted the power to repress 
misleading advertising spread out by any means: TV, newspapers, leaflets, posters, 
telemarketing. Since 2000 it has also begun to assess also the comparative advertising. In 
2007, following to the transposition of the EC Directive no. 29/2005 into the Italian law 
system (through the Consumer Code), ICA's competences in the consumer protection field 
have been broadened to the unfair commercial practices made by undertakings with 
detriment of consumers. ICA defines sanctions under the control of the Administrative Justice: 
Regional Administrative Court and Council of State. The changes in the regulatory system 
introduced in 2007 by D. Lgs n. 145/2007 and n. 146/2007 have defined the boundaries of 
the problems of misleading advertising and unfair commercial practices. The Authority was, 
therefore, reinforced in its role and competences since newer and stricter fines have been 
introduced.  
If an undertaking try to distort the economic choices of a consumer by, for instance, omitting 
relevant information, spreading out untruthful information or even using forms of undue 
influence, the ICA may act, also via interim measure, and impose fines which, since August 
2012, could range up to 5 million euro (previously, the maximum was 500.000,00 euro). 
Differently from the field of competition, the Authority, so far, has not published guidelines or 
other documentation relating to the quantification of the sanctions. Even regarding the 
imposition of a maximum amount, there is no analogy with the legislation on competition, 
since it is not required the 10% of company revenue. However our key informant tells us that 
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ICA take this parameter into account. Furthermore he says that in the next future the 
Authority will formulate guidelines also for the sector of Consumer Protection. In addition to 
the pecuniary sanction exists a damage related to the brand image of the company. All the 
measures in fact are published on ICA Bulletin available on its website. Most important cases 
are also widespread with a press release. Brand image damages remain difficult to quantify, 
but it is normal that are big companies and multinationals to take it into account. 
In 2012 ICA's protection against unfair commercial practices was extended also to the so-
called "micro-firms" (that is entities, companies or associations with less than 10 employees 
and an annual turnover that does not exceed 2 million euro). This innovation was introduced 
for two reasons. On one side it is necessary to fight Micro companies operating as a Index 
Group based on a coordinated strategy where each company has its own role and the 
companies advertise the opportunity to join a network through which small business and 
micro-enterprises could operate as a centre for the sale of a range of services using 
misleading advertising and unfair commercial practices21. On the other side this regulation is 
useful for many Micro companies which are damaged by other companies’ misleading 
advertising and unfair commercial practices. Micro companies can report these activities to 
ICA. This method is effective and doesn’t presuppose the costs related to an ordinary lawsuit. 
ICA is not entitled to refund the Micro company for the abuse received, that is a competence of 
ordinary court. 
Moreover, ICA was granted the enforcement of unfair contractual terms rules with reference 
to contractual forms or general contractual conditions drafted by sellers or suppliers and used 
with consumers. In this respect, ICA can either start an inquiry aimed at evaluating the unfair 
nature of contractual terms (ex officio or following to a complaint) or it can make an 
assessment under a specific request by a seller/supplier (the so-called “interpello”). 
In 2014 ICA’s areas of intervention were further extended to regulated markets; Antitrust can 
take decisions in these specific markets in accordance to the Authority for regulations. Thus, 
as it has been recently admitted by ICA (OECD, 2014), its sphere of competence on consumer 
protection has been enlarged in scope and effectiveness; thus, ICA had to face several 
incremental changes and transformed itself into a multi-function agency. 
IAP specifically focuses on misleading advertising. EC directives (no.450/84) highlight the 
role covered by autonomous organization when contrasting misleading advertising, since 
                                                          
21
 http://www.agcm.it/en/newsroom/press-releases/2093-ps3216-services-to-micro-enterprises-antitrust-sanctions-
companies-forming-part-of-index-group-for-misleading-advertising-and-unfair-commercial-practices-fines-totalling-
324000.html 
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they can “eliminate judicial actions or administrative appeals, and therefore (they) must be 
encouraged.” (http://www.iap.it/about/mission/?lang=en ).  
In 2005 EC, given the growing phenomenon of misleading practices, highlights the 
opportunity “to create codes of conduct so that professionals can apply the principles of this 
directive efficiently in specific economic sectors. The monitoring carried out by those behind 
these codes at a national or European level to eliminate practices of unfair competition can 
avoid having to take judicial or administrative steps, and thus should be encouraged.” 
(Directive no. 29/05).  
Based on Europe’s endorsement of this practice, in Italy, the Consumer Code has a standard 
that formally recognizes the existence of voluntary, autonomous self-regulatory bodies. 
Furthermore, this norm allows for the possibility to ask to suspend proceedings before 
authorities pending the ruling of the self-regulatory body. 
In the field of commercial communications, IAP is just one of the possible means for self-
regulation. Because of its history, its representativeness and its efficiency, it offers itself as a 
sort of “necessary community” made up of all of those various people who are interested in 
monitoring commercial communications. Thus, it has become a “natural” interlocutor for 
Italy’s Antitrust Authority. 
State judicial bodies have also recognized the value of Italian advertising self-regulation. For 
example, a ruling from the Court of Appeal referred to rules in IAP’s Code and specifically the 
value of parameters for propriety and a professional code of conduct, which can adapt the 
principle of professional ethics to the evolution of the needs of business. 
In addition to this formal recognition of self-regulation at national and European level, there 
is an agreement between the Ministry for Equal Opportunities and the Institute for 
Advertising Self-Regulation concerning commercial communications with gender-based 
content. 
It clearly emerges IAP’s role in consumer’s protection: it not only ensures advertisement 
transparency, but its interventions are rapid and effective. Differently from ICA, IAP can’t 
impose fines, but its investigation process is very fast; in fact the simplest cases only require a 
few days, while more complex cases are usually resolved in 8-12 working days. The Institute 
not only works to withdraw advertisements that do not follow rules, but it is also an 
important instrument of prevention. Moreover, the self-regulatory system is free of cost and 
easy for citizens to be requested. IAP’s Self-Regulatory Code is addressed to advertisers, 
agencies, consultants, media, sales houses and all those who might accept the Code within 
their contracts.  
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3.4 Data Analysis 
In the field research phase, we have initially contacted 90 companies operating in the agrifood 
sector during 2012. After a first contact we have carried out two recalling to fifteen days’ 
distance. 
Data have been collected through a survey. For preparing the survey a research has been 
performed in order to find out insights from the literature. Outcomes have emerged from the 
European DG Competition Stakeholder Survey (2014); the observations drawn from 
interviewees have helped to highlight critical issues to be investigated by the survey, and 
during the interview, too.  
In order to establish a direct contact with the companies we have firstly asked, by a phone 
call, for the person who faced the ICA or IAP decision and then we have sent an email to the 
contact provided. We have then combined the information gained through the survey with 
data available from third sources.  
Results are displayed in Table 21 
-------------------------- 
Table 21 (attachments) 
-------------------------- 
 
From the Analysis of data it emerges that Antitrust measures produce a greater effect on 
SMEs rather than big companies and multinationals. It is true that multinationals’ brand 
image will be damaged, but the bigger risk regards SMEs that can be put on the brink of 
bankruptcy. 
Companies 1, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 have changed their marketing campaigns after Antitrust or IAP 
intervention.  
In particular company 1, after €5.000 ICA sanction, created a new label to prevent confusion 
among consumers. 
Company 5 admitted “to be inaccurate”, it immediately change the communication and starts 
to operate following IAP recommendations. 
Company 7 affirmed “Consumption of alcoholic beverages in Italy,is strongly thwarted, as a 
consequence of some notorious cases of abuse that have been instrumentally used against our 
sector", eventually, company changed the claim for the next advertising campaigns due to the 
IAP intervention. 
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Company 8 justified Jury’s Decision saying “It was an outsourcing marketing communication. 
After Jury's decision we paid more attention to this specific service”, and immediately 
suspended the advertising campaign. 
Company 9 complained about the intervention: “We didn't agree with the Jury's Decision, but 
we respect it. We made some changes in our creativity claims but it's not due to the IAP 
decision”, however company suspended the advertising campaign. 
Company 10 affirmed “We have taken note of IAP injunction. Although we have a different 
opinion, we decided not to use the same creativity in the next poster campaign". 
In some particular product category no changes occurred. It is the case of food supplements. It 
can be said that among those interviewed food supplement companies often use hit and run 
strategies that motivates their decision not to change their promotion. In particular, Company 
4 and 6 were sanctioned by IAP. Company 4 affirmed "we didn't change our way of promoting 
goods", while Company 6 said “IAP injunctions refer to single campaigns, on which any 
company can make its objections”. 
There are, in fact, companies that decide to insist on promoting their goods in the same way, 
undergoing the ICA fine; from the table it emerges that Company 2 did not bring any 
communication changes. A Manager of External Affairs stated: "We believe we have acted in a 
legal way, but we were obliged to interrupt the advertising campaign. Anyway we didn't 
change our next marketing communications because of this fine”. From this sentence, it 
emerges that many companies, especially medium size enterprises and multinationals, when 
launching their advertising campaign are aware about the fact that they will be fined by the 
Authority, but apparently the increasing of sales volume justifies the amount of fines. 
When observing the length of ICA intervention we see that companies react in different ways. 
Small companies, like Company 1, immediately changed their operate, introducing major 
communication changes and following ICA’s guidelines, also for future steps. Large companies 
and multinationals, company 2 in our case, adopt no communication changes for their future 
campaigns and are reluctant to introduce quick changes to their operate. 
However, most of the times the Authority is able to avoid the repeating of violations, but 
cannot immediately stop an advertising campaign in progress because the measures usually 
take months to be completed. As opposed to the IAP, where the more complex cases are 
usually resolved in 8-12 working days. 
Managers and entrepreneurs have been asked if they have adopted any changes in their 
business activity. The majority have only modified the observed advertising campaign, saying 
they will follow Authority guidelines for future marketing activities. Company 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 
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did not adopt any changes. Company 2 and 10 did not answer the question. Company 1 
introduced major changes in its business activities. They changed packaging and label of the 
product. Moreover they have started to pay greater attention to the raw materials, which are 
100% Italian and carefully selected. 
 
3.5 Discussion  
From the analysis of the information and data collected some reflections can be drawn. Our 
discussion will explore two main and general issues: the relationship between competitive 
advantage and misleading practices and the adequateness of fines. The first issue basically 
explores what contributes to make misleading practices a profitable practice. The second 
issue explores the impact of fines and their efficacy.  
 
3.5.1 Unfair practices and competitive advantage 
Why a company decides to implement unfair commercial practices in its communication 
activities? The answer is simple: to gain profit and to improve its competitive advantage 
The characteristics of the competitive environment can influence firm’s decision to adopt 
unfair marketing practices. When examining the data about the economic situation, it emerges 
that Europe is experiencing a deep financial and economic crisis (see for indicators and 
detailed information the reports available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/crisis/index_en.htm ); this has affected firms and it 
requires companies to adapt to the changes in competitive patterns.  
Firms must possess an adequate set of resources (both material and immaterial) for facing the  
economic and financial crisis that is affecting Eurozone: some companies can see in 
questionable business practices a lever for achieving a competitive advantage and provide a 
solution for some of their problems. Scholars (Porter, 1990, 2011; Glaister, 1991) underline 
the linkage between the features of a national advantage and firms competitive success in 
global industries; by following emerging insights (Porter, 2011), it can be said that the advent 
of the Eurozone crisis negatively influenced, in many cases, national capacity to sustain firms’ 
competitive advantage. Therefore, companies have sought other ways for maintaining or 
improving their market positioning.  
Another reason is that companies feel the urgency of shortening the length of time usually 
required for building a consolidated relationship with customers. To build customer 
relationship through product quality or service would require more time – and investments - 
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than using unfair commercial practices. Misleading commercial practices can persuade 
consumers to take a “transactional decision”. In the long run the precarious consent of the 
costumer will get eroded, mainly because consumers get aware of firm’s manipulative 
intentions.  
Furthermore, integrity principles are a key component in strategic planning (Hosmer, 1994) 
whose lack weakens the entire value of a company strategy: stakeholders ‘negotiation is a 
pillar of strategic management and planning process (Freeman, 1984); thus when 
relationships are based upon misleading or unfair principles the whole strategic construct is 
jeopardized.  
Ethical issues and moral integrity can pay in the long run (Lantos, 1999); scholars have 
underlined how deceptive advertising can negatively affect consumers’ responses to newer 
promotional and commercial initiatives undertaken by the same company or third parties 
(Darke & Ritchie, 2015). 
Background research also underlines that when consumers get aware of the manipulative 
intent of companies, they can develop a suspicious attitude (Kirmani & Zhu, 2007). When 
consumer perceives deception, corporate credibility plummets; furthermore, consumers 
develop negative feelings towards the company (Newell et al., 2015).  
The work by Morales (2005) highlights that persuasion has a negative impact on consumers’ 
perception of products; on the contrary, consumers feel gratitude and a willingness to pay a 
premium price for those companies who spend efforts in promotion and communication.  
Companies who adopt misleading advertising in many cases underestimate the negative effect 
that they can have on their performance. Thus, the case of Vibram’s barefoot running shoes, 
has opened a wide debate among academicians on the damage that misleading advertising 
can bring to companies (Calo, 2015). It can be said that the adoption of unfair commercial 
practices can be conceived as a short term solution. 
The adoption of unfair practices if on one hand appears as a solution in the short run, on the 
other it opens to a multitude of wicked problems that companies must face in a long time 
range.  
First of all, firms must recover the relationship with the customer and invest on promoting a 
profitable and long lasting relationship; secondly companies must improve their set of 
competences and capabilities for facing market challenges. Firms who have to deal with 
Antitrust fines run the risk of facing a crisis. A crisis is the perception of an unpredictable 
event that threatens the expectancies of stakeholders and can seriously hinder an 
organization’s performance and generate negative outcomes (Coombs, 2007). 
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Therefore, crisis management is the framework used to prevent and lessen a crisis before it 
ruins the reputation of an organization. Coombs (2007) defines crisis management as “a 
process designed to prevent or lessen the damage a crisis can inflict to an organization and its 
stakeholders”. In order to anticipate and plan for a crisis, organizations need to have a pre-
crisis plan already established. This requires company to define a set of competences, 
resources and capabilities for managing a crisis into its three main stages: pre-crisis, crisis 
response and post-crisis.  
From our analysis it emerges that sanctions grew by 260% in the period 2007-2013; this 
confirms that unfair practices are still diffused. The question is: what makes this kind of 
behavior profitable for firms? There are many factors that emerge from our field research.  
A first factor is the dynamics of information. When the company is put under investigation by 
Antitrust, the news is provided by the Agency; sentences are published on sources that, unless 
they regard big or established brands, are not usually accessed by the majority of consumers.  
From the literature it emerges that media in food fraud cases (Cavicchi & Santini, 2011) have 
an impact in the short term; under this perspective, firms usually focus their investments in 
managing communication during the toughest phase of the process.  
From the data it also emerges that many of the companies have not felt the urgency for 
changing their communication campaign. Our findings suggest that, according to Heath 
(2006), Italian companies prefer to remain in the shadow and do not emphasize the ICA or 
IAP decision on their website nor social media. We didn’t find any company article on LEXIS 
NEXIS nor in Il Sole 24 ore database trying to justify the sanction received. 
As a result, the amount of investment required for managing information and marketing and 
improving corporate image after a fee is reduced.  
A second issue deals with the length of time needed for an intervention: the average number 
of months for an ICA procedure is 7.  
When the procedure is completed, the company has exploited the competitive advantage it 
has already gained in terms of profits. The longer it takes to get a sanction, the more a 
company can get profits from misleading practices. If the economic benefit at the end of the 
procedure is particularly high, the fine is inadequate. As a result, fines, as it emerges from our 
analysis, do not seem to have negative outcomes for the turnover, especially for Big 
Companies.  
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3.5.2 Efficacy and limits of Fines 
The literature on violation and fines provides interesting insights for examining the object 
under investigation. In order to understand the mechanism that regulates interventions and 
fines, a focus on the vision of the Authority and its approach to interventions must be carried 
out. Useful insights emerge from the work by Ginsburg and Wright (2010) who provides an 
overview of Antitrust sanctions worldwide: existing differences and approaches among 
countries make it harder to compare regimes of sanctions and their effectiveness.  
The basic principles that inspire the vision of AGCM have been depicted in 2012 by the AGCM 
General Secretary Alberto Pera: the components of an effective antitrust enforcement should 
be composed by a “negative” general prevention, on the basis of deterrence, aimed at avoiding 
future criminal activity, and a “positive” general prevention, based on the development of a 
competition culture in which anticompetitive conducts are considered socially 
reprehensible.22 
Deterrence through the use of fines can work if, and only if, from the perspective of the 
company contemplating whether or not to commit a violation, the expected fine exceeds the 
expected gain from the violation. The work by Ginsburg and Wright (2010) shows the ongoing 
debate and it proposes hypothesis based on the inclusion of different actors in the process of 
defining the optimal degree of sanctions. The expected fine equals the nominal amount of the 
fine discounted by the probability that a fine is effectively imposed (Wils, 2006). 
Thus, a distinction among violations must be stressed: firstly, there is a wide difference within 
the category of violations; secondly some types of violations are more easily detectable than 
others.  
The effects of a fine reception also differ among firms, and this issue should be taken into 
account. Most of the research in the field has examined the role of Antitrust in preventing 
cartels (Muzata & Mnisi, 2005; Motta, 2007; OECD 2002); from the literature it emerges the 
general belief that high fines can have a negative impact on firms. In a work published in 
2007, Motta underlines that several issues must be taken into account when establishing the 
impact of fines on firms’ activity, and in particular: “(i) legal and consulting costs for antitrust 
purposes, (ii) a firm giving up profitable projects either because management is distracted by 
the antitrust investigations and/or because, in the case of large fines, the firm will have lower 
retained earnings and cash: in imperfect financial markets, lower assets will limit the firm’s 
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 “Antitrust fines, alternative measures and compliance”, Treviso Antitrust conference 17-18 Maggio 2012 
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ability to obtain credit, (iii) the firm may be hurt by the negative publicity following an 
antitrust investigation”. 
Thus, it is reasonable to assume that firms might differ in their approach to fines and 
sanctions; as it emerges from the literature (Blair and Sokol, 2014), some firms show a 
stronger orientation towards establishing collaborative behaviors with Authorities than 
others.  
Furthermore, it can be said that experience in the business plays a key role in shaping the 
attitude towards authorities: some companies may better succeed in avoiding apprehension 
than others because of their gained experience23. The probability of actually being fined 
obviously also depends on the competition authorities' enforcement priorities and their 
available resources.  
For these reasons, Wils (2006) says that the optimal fine should exceed the expected gain 
from the violation, multiplied by the inverse of the probability of detection. 
Thus fines have a dual role: on one side they are a tool for preventing violations (Wils, 2006), 
and on the other they represent a mean for protecting consumers and preserving, as Scuffi 
(2009) says, “the competitive structure of the market against unfair commercial practices and 
anti-competitive behaviors”.  
Fines can be also employed to shape corporate culture: they have a deterrent effect, since they 
create a credible threat of being prosecuted and fined; and a moral effect (Wils, 2006). Fines 
also represent a pressure for reshaping firms’ strategy.  
Under this perspective, consumer protection has gradually become a priority objective of the 
European competition authorities. Since 2005 – due to a judgment of the united section of the 
supreme court (n.2207/02.04.2005) – antitrust set of rules must protect both companies and 
consumers. 
We have already explored the relationship between the adoption of misleading practices and 
competitive advantage in the previous paragraph; it has emerged that the length of the 
process can influence the perception of the economic impact that arises from misleading 
advertising. From our analysis further elements arise.  
The issue of efficacy in fines should also be considered by a twofold approach: the adequate 
amount of fine; and the effectiveness of fine applicability.  
Once the fine is defined, the challenge is to make it applicable; some firms have gained 
experience in avoiding apprehension. This “skill” represents an incentive for firms who decide 
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to adopt misleading practices. From the analysis of cases in the food supplement sector, it 
emerges the case of a company that was pursued by IAP in the period 2007-2008 but didn’t 
receive any sanction from ICA. The main reason was that the company desisted on going on 
with the marketing campaign, accepting the verdict of the Institute. In this way this company 
took an advantage in terms of time. After few months they started new campaigns, using 
similar violations but again, when the IAP delivered its judgment, the company interrupted 
the unfair practice. This company received a Jury decision, n. 102/2007 and twelve Review 
Board decisions: n. 57/2007, n. 66/2007, n. 77/2007, n. 87/2007, n. 98/2007, n. 114/2007, n. 
115/2007, n. 16/2008, n. 20/2008, n. 23/2008, n. 27/2008, n. 37/2008. According to the 
information we have collected, it can be said that companies have gained a deep knowledge of 
the mechanisms that regulate interventions and can systematically operate for avoiding 
apprehension. The set of knowledge that limits the applicability of sanctions progressively 
become more accessible and there is the risk that firms imitate what has been done by 
companies who have received IAP judgement.  
The framework that emerges is that the system of fines can loose of efficacy when firms 
pursue adaptive behaviors that can limit the impact of the Antitrust system.  
 
3.6 Conclusions 
This study has the merit of introducing a newer perspective, that focuses on managerial 
issues, to the analysis carried out in the field of Antitrust research; the importance of 
employing tools of analysis from different areas in this specific research issue has been deeply 
investigated by Sullivan (2002).  
There is a wide debate about the optimal level of sanctions that must be set in dealing with 
unfair commercial practices: in fact, there are many issues that must be considered 
simultaneously when setting fines. There is no doubt that the impact that fees might have in 
terms of affected commerce or firms’ turnover influence national fining policy (Bageri et 
al.2012); furthermore, risk aversion and neutrality among managers influence deterrence 
orientation (Bageri et al., 2012).  
Thus the risk perception of adopting unfair practices is strictly related to the probability of 
being caught, that, as outlined by Suurnakki (2012) is influenced by the ex officio 
investigation and by the probability that someone else applies for leniency. According to this, 
it clearly emerges the critical role played by consumers associations whose aims are to inform 
about rights and to support citizens.  
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Some authors underline how managing antitrust risk can be considered as a key competence 
among firms (Darji et al., 2014); this reinforce the need for introducing a newer perspective 
when evaluating efficacy of fines among firms. Given the importance of firms’ features in 
relation to risk perception, it is extremely important to investigate any existing relationships 
between firms’ and management characteristics and the efficacy of fines.  
As it emerges from the literature, most of the research has been carried out to explore the 
quantification of the damages arising from anticompetitive conducts (see among the others, 
Notaro, 2012). Some scholars such as Motta (2007) also highlight the importance of defining a 
set of combination of leniency programs and measures that can reduce the period between 
the inception of the investigation and the committee decision; from several sources we have 
used in our research it clearly emerges the need to reduce the length of time between 
investigation and final decision.  
From the analysis it clearly emerges that there is an accurate system planned for avoiding and 
limiting misleading practices. Thus, firms have been capable to adapt to the set of imposed 
rules and to reduce the efficacy of the proposed dissuasive system. Yet, from the study it 
emerges that it is necessary to reduce the perceived competitive advantage. In order to 
achieve this aim, some minor interventions can be done: a reduction of the length of time of 
the process would improve the efficacy of the system.  
From this research it emerges that an element to be investigated is the impact that a shortage 
of ICA's intervention process could have on firm's strategies. In fact, those who are more likely 
to adopt an "hit and run" strategy would see their short time competitive advantage seriously 
threatened and they would consequently be forced to adopt minor or major changes in their 
promotional strategy. In our field research, we didn’t receive any feedback from food 
supplement companies sanctioned by ICA, but studying secondary data from ICA database we 
can state that these companies benefit, for all the duration of ICA action, of an increase in 
terms of sales.  Consequently they were reluctant to introduce quick changes to their operate.  
Another interesting issue concerns the role of information about fines and firms affected by 
interventions. It has emerged the impact that the news of interventions has on consumers is 
mitigated by several factors such as the diffusion of the news on selected channels, the 
accessibility of information and the relevancy given by firms to the news. Yet, further 
researches should be carried out in this direction. We can say that another player must be 
taken into account when we explore the relationship between consumers, information and 
antitrust interventions; we are talking about consumers associations, whose role has been 
partially explored by the literature. The involvement of consumers associations or opinion 
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leaders in the stakeholders’ community that is affected by intervention can reshape the entire 
framework. Therefore, we must say that the concept of misleading advertising is evolving; the 
US is focusing on the role that advertising in the food industry can have on children. Story and 
French (2004) explore the relationship between advertising and eating habits in American 
children and adolescents population; Graff et al. (2014) have explored the role that 
government could have in regulating advertising. The mentioned work highlight that the 
boundaries of the phenomenon of misleading advertising are expanding and they must take 
into account the target of the advertising with their features and inner characteristics. Thus a 
major flexibility of the Antitrust system is required, since newer needs emerge from the 
market and it requires a “customization” of interventions.  
This could have a positive impact on the effectiveness of sanctions: firms could easily adapt to 
a standardized system and they are more able to prevent and contrasts a rigid protocol of 
intervention. Regarding the establishment of ICA, from our information it emerges that the 
Institute was born as a consequence of EU directive disposition, following a top-down 
process. and not as a better organization of the Italian Consumer Protection issues; some 
further research should be carried out in order to explore the degree of adaptability of a top 
down designed organization to needs that specifically emerge at a country level.  
Hopefully, further research should be carried out in order to evaluate the impact of 
misleading practices on skills and competences at a firm level. Newer research should be done 
on the motivations that pull companies to pursue misleading advertising practices.  
This research issue opens a multitude of research questions that can be susceptible of further 
investigation both at a country and international level.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
The EU has adopted policy instruments to enforce specific fields, namely: agricultural product 
quality policy and Consumer rights and law. The question arises as to whether these tools 
could be considered as useful to meet their objectives. 
On the one hand, this research demonstrates that GIs could be a very important instrument, 
especially for remote regions and less favoured areas. 
What consumers want and expect from food producers is to be transparent about policies, 
practices, performance and verification. Transparency is key in building trust, and 
information included on food product labels is an important practice to this end. 
If consumers are aware of GIs meaning and are willing to pay a premium price, then the 
Consumer Protection is fundamental not only for consumers, but also for the companies. In 
other words, through consumer protection law, the Italian Competition Authority is also 
defending the competitive system of enterprises producing high quality products. As a 
consequence, the value that consumers attribute to EU food quality logos can become a 
competitive advantage for companies. 
Ethnocentrism, Country of Origin effect and consumers’ food choices are other crucial 
variables affecting the perception and the willingness-to-pay for quality food products. 
The exploratory study on the Italian egg made pasta carried out in Sweden and Italy suggests 
that consumers attribute a considerable value to PGI pasta from Campofilone and PGI from 
their own country. Moreover, when buying foodstuff, the most important factor for both 
Swedish and Italian consumers is sensory appeal. There are also some differences: Swedish 
consumers appear to be very concerned about healthy foods, while Italians attach more 
importance to Price factor. The sample of Swedish interviewees is not ethnocentric, while 
Italian consumers are highly ethnocentric. 
The research shows there is a growing market of proteins and healthy food in general in 
Nordic Countries; therefore SMEs should focus on this aspect. Protein content in combination 
with the PGI logo could be a decisive marketing tool for companies located in Campofilone 
producing high quality egg pasta. 
EU quality logos offer many important advantages to GIs producers. Access to new markets 
and to promotion funds and investment aid, better access from participation in national and 
international fairs resulting in sales increase, and protection of intellectual property rights are 
aspects that producers should take into account. 
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On the other hand, one of the major negative effects beyond the use of PDO, PGI and TSG 
labels regards the food piracy and fraud, which cause economic damage to the whole 
production chain. 
In Italy the ICA regulates consumer protection since 1992. 
Data analysis on consumer protection shows that some firms have planned an accurate 
system of unfair commercial practices to circumvent the set of imposed rules and to reduce 
the efficacy of the proposed dissuasive system.  
To this purpose, some minor interventions could be done, such as a reduction of the length of 
time spent for the decision process would improve the efficacy of the system.  
Another important element to be investigated emerges from this study and concerns the 
impact that a shortage of ICA's intervention process could have on firm's strategies. In fact, 
those firms that are more likely to adopt an "hit and run" strategy would see their short time 
competitive advantage seriously threatened and would consequently be forced to adopt 
minor or major changes in their promotional strategy.  
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